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ABSTRACT

TWO ESSAYS ON INVESTOR DIFFERENTIATION IN INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE MARKETS
BY
Yu Liu
April 11, 2016

Committee Chair:

Dr. Jonathan A. Wiley

Major Academic Unit:

Department of Real Estate

This dissertation consists of two essays on investor differentiation in industrial real estate markets. The first essay
examines the following questions: (1) Do corporates buy or sell at different prices when transacting in the industrial
market (as assessed from a comparison between the transactions of corporates and non-institutional investors)? (2) If
such a difference does exist, what are the factors that determine its magnitude? Unlike in prior studies on the office
market, corporate investors only buy high but do not sell low when transacting in industrial real properties. The
pattern of buying high by corporates is consistent during market cycles and across general- and special-purpose
property types. The results reflect a higher cost of real capital (acquisition cost) to corporates, and generally imply
that the price a corporate is willing to pay is determined primarily from an overall business value perspective, rather
than property market value.
In the second essay, I examine the performance of government investors in the industrial market. The analysis
reveals that, in general, governments buy high and sell low in comparison to similar property transactions by
individuals. On average, governments overpay by an estimated 9.8% and sell at a discount of 17.3%. The results
may help governments identify a potential vulnerable point on their real estate management, and reduce their loss if
they can mitigate this inefficiency.
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Essay I
Corporate Investors in Industrial Real Estate Markets
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Essay I: Corporate Investors in Industrial Real Estate Markets
________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction

According to Edwards and Ellison (2009), property can be held for one of two purposes: as an investment
asset or as an operational asset. Property held as an investment asset is used for generating capital gain.
Property held as an operational asset, sometimes called corporate property, is used for supporting business
operation. Most owner-occupied industrial real properties can be seen as corporate property1. Industrial
real property, an important input for many businesses, is used to house the operational activities of firms
including manufacturing, warehousing and distribution of goods. Industrial real property transactions are
common among corporates as their businesses expand and contract. The transaction price composes the
cost of real capital to corporates, and real estate price is often identified as the second-largest cost to
businesses, next to labor cost, as documented by Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983), Bon and Luck
(1999a), and Bootle and Kalyan (2002).

Research focusing on real asset management and the impact of real property investment on firm value has
been well documented. Less studied, however, are the market outcomes from real estate transactions (cost
of real capital) made by corporates in real estate markets, especially in the industrial market. Wiley (2012)
is a recent study focusing on the market outcomes of corporate real estate transactions. The study shows
that non-real estate corporate investors buy high and sell low compared to non-institutional investors in
the office market. As possible explanations, the study enumerated and evaluated several theories, such as
the difference in operating performance, valuation, tax consequences, cyclical investment, marketing
behavior, agency problems, selection bias, and option pricing. Among them, valuation difference, cyclical
investment, and impatience are found to significantly contribute to transaction price differences. Inspired
by Wiley (2012), this study investigates the market outcomes of transactions by non-real estate corporates
in the industrial market and compares them with transactions by non-institutional investors2. This study
focuses on two questions. First, does the cost of real capital differ between non-real estate corporates and

1

Due to the limitation of the data, only approximate measure can be used to reflect the proportion of owner-occupied industrial
real properties in the sample of this study. If we assume the non-real estate corporate investors are owner-occupiers, then the
proportion of owner-occupied industrial real properties in the purchase sample of this study will be 27.67% and the proportion of
owner-occupied industrial real properties in the sales sample equals to 28.44%.
2
As suggested in Wiley (2012), non-institutional investors consist of individuals and developers as categorized in CoStar. If we
take a further look on the forms of these business organizations, we can see that they are organized as sole proprietary or
partnership.
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non-institutional industrial real estate investors, as reflected by transaction prices? Second, if it does, what
are the factors that contribute to the difference from perspective of the property, transaction, and investor?
As pointed out by Wheaton and Torto (1990), “the industrial real estate market in the U.S. is substantially
different from that for other types of commercial property.” In the industrial market, properties are more
likely to be owner-occupied 3 . Only a small portion of the sector is available for speculative rental
purposes, and most rental properties are designed for single tenant occupancy4. Compared to other real
estate assets, industrial properties are thinly traded, have a shorter development period, and are more
likely to be built for the end user. Thus, industrial real estate has a different market cycle and is subject to
different investor behavior. More specifically, Wheaton and Torto (1990) point out that industrial
property market only shows little evidence of a traditional real estate cycle and just move slightly with
economic cycle, which quite different from the strong cyclic behavior of office market. In addition,
industrial properties are built to house firms’ operational activities. Thus, the value of an industrial
property to the business depends on the operational activities it houses. For property transactions in the
industrial market, owner-occupiers are more likely to rely on investment value rather than the estimated
market value, and the price a corporation is willing to pay is determined largely from the perspective of
the overall business value. As aforementioned, these characteristics of industrial markets suggest that
property acquisition and divestiture decisions by corporates are different between the industrial market
and other property types, leaving the sector open for potential investigation. For example, a higher
investment value of owner-occupiers without correction from market value may push the transaction price
up in purchasing and divestitures; and the cyclical effect may not hold same in the industrial market as it
has been found in the office market.

Real estate markets have been historically documented as inefficient markets characterized by
heterogeneous assets, localized markets, confidential transactions, informational asymmetries, and highly
cyclical adjustments to supply. The inefficiencies magnify the impact of decisions made by different
group of investors on the value of a property, which is then reflected in the final transaction price. In real
3

This claim is for the population. Unlike non-institutional investors, corporates tend to make real estate transactions less
frequently, so if we only look at the sample of transactions in this study, we may notice that less than one-third of the samples
was purchased by corporates. However, as suggested by Wheaton and Torto (1990), owner-occupied properties dominate the
population. If we take a look on the new supplies (incremental, property age less than five years), we can get some idea on that
corporate purchases dominate the market. For example, 55% of the properties with an age less than five years was bought by
corporates. Further break down the data, we can see that 60% of the properties (3/6) with an age less than one year was bought by
corporates; 58% of the properties (11/19) with an age of one year was bought by corporates; 31% of the properties (4/13) with an
age of two years was bought by corporates; 69% of the properties (29/42) with an age of three years was bought by corporates;
63% of the properties (77/122) with an age of four years was bought by corporates; 50.3% of the properties (171/340) with an
age of five years was bought by corporates;
4
Table 1-1 summary statistics shows that more than 60% of the observations in both purchase and sales samples are single tenant
properties.
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estate markets, the transaction price of a property is negotiated between potential buyers and sellers based
on their estimation of the property’s investment value. When investing in real estate markets, different
investors make decisions based on their individual backgrounds and considerations, such as the proposed
use of the property, specialized market knowledge, experiences, origination, and property attributes.
These unique backgrounds and considerations translate into estimations of a property’s investment value
and its characteristics. The transaction price can then be observed once the maximum investment value of
a buyer exceeds the minimum investment value of the seller. The relative success of an acquisition or
divestiture can be observed when investors buy or sell at different prices because their investment value
perceptions differ. These price differences can also be expected and predicted when the decision- and
valuation-driven factors are systematically associated with their unique characteristics.

Market outcome differences between transactions by corporates and non-institutional investors are
investigated within the framework of investor clientele effects. The method of testing clientele effects has
been well established. The first precise definition of clientele effects can be found in a study by DaleJohnson (1983). He defines investor clientele effects as the variation in the willingness to pay as a
function of investors’ segmentation. After this study, the literature has provided strong evidence for
investor clientele effects in the real estate markets5. Equipped with extant methodologies, I can examine
the price differences between transactions by corporates and non-institutional investors and explore the
factors that affect market outcomes. According to the theories documented in the literature, this study
examines the internal factors of firms based on their distinguishable characteristics, such as firm type, size,
location, and the industry in which the firm conducts its main business, to reveal the impacts on market
outcomes. Meanwhile, several property and transactional factors are also examined, including the type of
industrial real estate asset, market conditions of the transaction, and involvement of brokerage.

1.1 Contribution of the Study

This study adopts and systematically investigates several theories that possibly explain market outcome
differences in the industrial market between corporates and non-institutionals. An examination of the
potential explanations and impact factors provide answers to question on why corporations perform

5

Research related to clientele effects can be found in, among others, Vrooman (1978), Dale-Johnson (1983), Miller, Sklarz, and
Real (1988), Myer, He, and Webb (1992), Turnbull and Sirmans (1993), Watkins (1998), Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans
(2003), Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004), Wood and Tu (2004), Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006), Benjamin, Chinloy,
Hardin, and Wu (2008), Neo, Ong, and Tu (2008), Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012), Wiley (2012), Chernobai and Chernobai
(2013), Liu, Gallimore, and Wiley (2013), and Zhou, Gibler, and Zahirovic-Herbert (2014).
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differently in the industrial market and sheds light on investigating on the discordant messages from the
literature.

The contributions of this study are manifold. First, this study presents the results of the corporate
investment policy and discloses the scale of market outcome differences between the transactions of
corporates and non-institutional investors in the industrial market. The market outcome difference reveals
the cost of real capital in corporate investment. Identifying the difference in cost could help corporates to
refine their investment policy.

Second, this study further examines the factors that determine the magnitude of the market outcome
difference in transactions made within corporates. To reveal the magnitude of the difference, a number of
internal factors such as firm type, size, location, and the industry in which the firm conducts its main
business are examined. The correlation among firms’ characteristics and magnitude of underperformance
reveals areas of vulnerability that corporate investors should consider.

Third, as pointed out by Wheaton and Torto (1990), the substantial differences between the characteristics
of industrial real property and other types of commercial property would cause property values in the
industrial market vary among different investors in a different way. Thus, the special characteristics of
industrial real properties are considered and controlled for a thorough and accurate analysis in this study.
For example, in contrast to prior studies, industrial real estate properties are often categorized into two
different subcategories based on the purpose of their use: the general-purpose and special-purpose
submarkets. This distinction in the purpose of use affects the availability of the market value and
comparable recent prices for a transaction. Therefore, failure to control for the property attributes based
on the purpose of use could potentially bias the investor differentiation effects. In this study, I control for
the purpose of property use based on specified property types6.

1.2 Organization of the Study

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and presents
the hypotheses related to the research questions. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methods
used to test the alternative expectations. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The final chapter offers
the concluding remarks, and a list of references is provided at the end.
6

For example, the property types include distribution, food processing, manufacturing, refrigeration/cold storage, service,
showroom, telecom hotel/data hosting, truck terminals, and warehouses.
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Corporate investors and corporate real estate have drawn increased attention over the past several decades,
and the asset management and real estate strategies of non-real estate corporates have been studied more
extensively. For example, as outlined by Edwards and Ellison (2009), property is a vital component of
business, which supports its operational activities. Miles, Pringles, and Webb (1989) and Liow (1995)
suggest that corporate real estate decisions should be viewed from a combined capital
budgeting/corporate financing framework and that a corporation’s real estate holdings could affect the
firm’s cost of capital, debt capacity, systematic risk, operating revenues, and expenses. Rodriguez and
Sirmans (1996) evaluate various real estate decisions on firm value, such as leasing, acquisitions, sell-offs,
and liquidations. They find that real estate decisions have a significant impact on firm value. Seiler,
Chatrath, and Webb (2001) test the diversification benefit of real estate ownership to corporates; however,
they do not find any evidence of such a benefit7.

The literature contains detailed investigations on the relationship between real asset investment decisions
and the overall performance of non-real estate companies. However, studies on the market outcomes from
the transaction price—the cost of the real capital investment of a firm—are limited. This is probably
because data on specific transactions of real estate assets, especially industrial, were not easily available
when the research was conducted. For example, as pointed out by Ambrose (1990), “unfortunately, for
the most part, industrial property is ignored in the literature. Problems with collecting data and small
sample sizes hamper the study of industrial property.” Moreover, echoed by Peiser and Hamilton (2012),
“Few

market

data

sources

segment

industrial

space

beyond

the

three

main

categories

warehouse/distribution, manufacturing, and flex, and in many cases, secondary market data are lumped
into a single category labeled industrial, making it difficult to assess the performance of individual

7

This study does not tend to focus on the operational or event factors that potentially affect the market outcomes when
businesses transact in the industrial real estate market, such as change in chief management, change in value of the businesses’
stocks, merger or acquisition of the companies, industry consolidation or vertical integration, or the event of SEO or repurchase
programs. Only narrative or anecdotal evidence will be provided where relevant. Acquisitions or divestitures are corporate
decisions made for various reasons. For a few examples, in 2007, Toyota Boshoku, interior parts supplier for automakers,
acquired a 47,782 sq. ft. class B building as a technical center in Corporate Campus at Novi, Michigan, to meet its growing
demand. In 2008, the International Paper Co. acquired 155,000 sq. ft. class C warehouse space in Chemway Industrial Park,
North Carolina, to expand its operation. In 2010, Kohl’s Department Stores acquired a 100,260 sq. ft. class B building to house
its new state-of-the-art photo studio in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 2008, the Real Estate Department of Kodak Corporation sold
its 2,000,000 sq. ft. class B Kodak Distribution Center at Rochester, NY, as part of its divestiture program for real estate the
corporation no longer needed. In 2007, Coca-Cola sold its 100-year-old Coca-Cola Bottling Building located at Tacoma, WA,
following its relocation to a larger facility.

6

subtypes.” Whatever the reason, market outcome studies on transaction prices, particularly for the
industrial market, represent a gap in the literature that needs to be filled.

Wiley (2012) was the first study that tried to fill the gap in the literature. In his study, Wiley enumerates
the reasons that might possibly lead to market outcome differences in corporate transactions in the office
market, and finds that corporate investors buy high and sell low relative to non-institutional investors in
similar office properties. Wiley (2012) provides a foundation for this study. I build on his work, extending
the study from the office market to the industrial market, to evaluate transactions made by corporates and
further explore the rationale behind their decisions.
This study first investigates the question “Do corporates buy or sell at different prices when transacting in
the industrial market (as assessed from a comparison between the transactions of corporates and noninstitutional investors)?” Related issues have been discussed in the literature. While Redman and Tanner
(1989) suggest that corporations usually conduct a more specific analysis when they purchase a property
compared with selling one, Bender (1991) points out that the management of a corporation typically
disposes of real estate when it finds that it has to sell surplus property. Moreover, Bender (1991)
concludes that knowing a property’s value is vital in order to avoid selling at a lower price. In addition, as
pointed out by Wiley (2012), a corporate would like to pay a premium during an expansion to outbid
other competitors in the market and still enjoy an extra benefit after deducting the overpayment. However,
some economic pressure, such as a contraction, or overvaluing a call option drive away corporates from
selling at a similar price as compared to non-institutional investors. Moreover, in a survey, Nourse and
Kingery (1987) show that even though half of firms ignore the opportunities to sell for a better price in
divestiture when they try to sell their surplus properties, the other half try to maximize shareholder value
by selling at a higher price. The challenge with industrial markets, in contrast to other real estate markets,
is that corporate investment value may differ widely from market value. The reasons of these differences
are from two folds. First, Wheaton and Torto (1990) argue that the industrial real estate market is
substantially different from that for other types of commercial property, and the characteristics of
industrial properties drive a different valuation from different investors. Second, the valuation difference
is also suggested by McKinley and Simpson (2005). As they pointed out that “industrial property clearly
serve different purposes than other types of property, and it generally has certain characteristics that
distinguish it from the appraisal of one of the other major classifications of land use-office, retail, hotel,
and residential.” Some general features must be accounted for in estimating the value of industrial
properties, such as the dearth of alternative uses for special-purpose industrial property. Thus, the
question that arises is as follows: Do corporate investors buy high and sell low in the industrial market as

7

well in industrial market, as suggested under several explanations by the literature? Or, do corporates
behave differently due to special features as aforementioned in the industrial market? To answer these
questions, I first evaluate the transaction prices on both the purchase and divestiture sides in order to
determine if there is a price difference in the transactions. Further, if a difference does exist, the factors
that determine the difference are then examined. The following hypotheses are tested.

H1a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates buy at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals.
H1b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates sell at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals.

2.1 Determinants of Price Difference

Several theories postulate that the behavior of corporates is different from that of other types of investors
(Wiley, 2012).

The Theory of Capital Investment and Option Pricing

One explanation for firms’ valuation, buy, and sell decisions on industrial properties is based on the
theory of capital investment and option pricing.

Traditional capital theory assumes that investment reversal is costless. Jorgenson (1963) proposes that
investment is optimal when the firm’s marginal revenue product of capital equals the user cost of capital.
Businesses buy or sell capital to balance the marginal revenue product of capital with the user cost of
capital. Five years after Jorgenson (1963), Arrow (1968) showed that investment can be irreversible and
periods of inactivity can exist even when the marginal revenue product of capital is lower than the value
triggering capital purchase. While Jorgenson (1963) and Arrow (1968) delineate the upper and lower
limits of investment, the most common situation occurs between the two limits: costly reversibility.
Costly reversibility of investment was first introduced by Abel and Eberly (1996) and Abel, Dixit, Eberly,
and Pindyck (1995). They describe costly reversibility as a situation in which businesses will divest their
real capital at a cheaper price in the future than their current acquisition price. Further, the situation in
which businesses would have to pay a higher acquisition price in the future than at present was defined as
costly expandability. Corporate investment in real capital is affected by put or call options associated with
costly reversibility and costly expandability. Wiley (2012) further shows that, under costly reversibility,
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“the price of purchasing capital equals the marginal value of that capital plus a put option to sell, and the
price of divestiture equals the marginal value of capital minus a call option to repurchase.” Thus,
overvaluation on these put or call options will cause firms to buy high and sell low. He also points out the
factors that could affect the option values, such as volatility of cash flows, cost of capital, maturity,
assumed strike price, and information about the distribution of possible asset values.

The theory of capital investment and option pricing provide us with a framework to understand the timing
under which corporates enter into real estate transactions. Although data availability limits the ability to
directly test each of the factors suggested by the theory, valuation differences in industrial assets between
corporate and non-institutional investors can still be verified. The hypothesis to be tested is provided
below.

H2: Prices for transactions between corporate buyers and corporate sellers are no different than
those between non-institutional buyers and sellers.

Market Conditions

Market conditions provide the second theoretical foundation for valuation and transaction price
differences between corporate investors and non-institutional investors. Market conditions and market
duration may alter the investors’ decisions regarding their willingness to buy or sell when they enter into
a transaction. During periods of expansion, the property market has increased investment activity and
greater liquidity, which perhaps leads to higher competition when purchasing and, in turn, higher
acquisition price and selling price, accompanied by a shorter time on market (TOM). However, the story
differs for a down market. During contraction, the market has low liquidity and is usually characterized
by a greater number of sellers than buyers. As a result, properties may have to be sold at a discount or
remain on the market for an extended period of time.

Corporate investors make acquisition or divestiture decisions that appear to be influenced by economic
cycles. For example, Wiley (2012) finds, by testing the transaction price differences in the office market
between corporate investors and non-institutional investors, that corporate investors pay a significantly
higher price when they buy and they sell at a discount upon divesture. The results are explained by the
business cycle since corporations overpay during expansions and liquidate during economic contraction.

9

Corporates use industrial properties to house their manufacturing activities. As Kolbe and Greer (2009)
pointed out, “in industrial market, demand for industrial space is largely a function of the demand for
products produced by the industrial sector.” The forces that cause the demand for manufactured goods to
increase or decrease also cause the demand for industrial space to increase or decrease. “Nonetheless,
corporates generally adjust their space needs based on long-term projections of product demand so
changes in demand for space are not as volatile as changes in demand for industrial goods”. As suggested
by Kolbe and Greer, to meet the increase in demand for manufactured goods during periods of expansion,
corporates might have to pay a premium to outbid their competitors and still enjoy the residual benefits.
However, during contraction, corporates might not be willing to sell their properties at a discount in a
short period of time in response to the shock of change in demand for industrial goods. In addition, as
pointed out by Peiser and Hamilton (2012), industrial space has some advantages over other property
types. For example, “The capital expenditures are lower than for other product types, especially office
space, and industrial property has a lower ratio of operating expenses to revenue which means that it will
perform better in up markets because more income drops to the bottom line” which suggests that
corporate investors will have more capital and return when making an investment in industrial market to
outbid the non-institutionals. The investment value for corporate investors will be higher than noninstitutionals, especially in up markets, so do they will pay an even higher premium in expansion. On the
other hand, industrial properties have more specialized purposes of use and could have fewer potential
buyers. It often takes a longer time to sell an industrial property8, and it is may be more difficult for
corporates to find substitutable space later on. As a result, corporates are expected to pay a premium when
purchasing but might not be willing or able to sell at a different price. Meanwhile, as suggested in the
literature, even though corporates have a higher investment value on their industrial properties, however,
in divestiture, the asset market is unaffected by what the corporation believes the property is worth for
investment value. In the absence of another buyer who holds similar valuation for the asset, it is difficult
to recover any of their overpayment in the selling price at the end of the holding period. Moreover, as
Wheaton and Torto (1990) pointed out that industrial property market only shows little evidence of a
traditional real estate cycle and just move slightly with economic cycle, so the pattern of buy high but sell
similar may hold the same in both expansion and contraction. Thus, I formulate the following hypotheses
based on the theory and the aforementioned rationale, and I expect corporates pay a premium but sell at a
similar price across market cycles and the premium they paid is higher in expansion than contraction:

8

The marketing duration of industrial transactions is 431.37 days with a standard deviation of 411.69 days when selling. The
marketing duration of office transactions is 367.80 days with a standard deviation of 370.31 days when selling.
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H3a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates buy at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals during periods of economic expansion.
H3b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates sell at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals during periods of economic expansion.
H4a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates buy at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals during periods of economic contraction.
H4b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates sell at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals during periods of economic contraction.

Market Duration

Market duration is often viewed as a combined component of market equilibrium with transaction prices.
While many studies have focused on marketing duration, evidence for the relation between price and
TOM is inconsistent when taken together. For example, Cubbin (1974) shows that a house with a higher
price could be sold faster because it may indicate better quality. Similarly, Knight (2002) finds a negative
relationship between sales price and TOM. However, Ong and Koh (2000) and Levitt and Syverson (2008)
empirically detected a positive relationship between TOM and the price. Moreover, Cheng, Lin, and Liu
(2008) theoretically showed a positive relationship between sales price and TOM. Although no consensus
appears in the literature on this question, previous studies have demonstrated a strong relationship
between transaction price and market duration. In addition, Wiley (2012) points out that market duration
can be seen as a behavioral factor reflecting the relative patience of investors, which may help explain the
decisions made by an investor in a particular transaction. Moreover, as McKinley and Simpson (2005)
and Peiser and Hamilton (2012) suggest corporates have a higher investment value on industrial
properties with fewer potential buyers in divestitures, in combination with a relatively less volatile market
as suggested by Wheaton and Torto (1990), the time on market for selling an industrial property by
corporate investors may no less than the time on market on the selling by non-institutionals if they want
to get a better deal in divestitures. For that reason, this research evaluates the respective effects of investor
clientele effects on market duration in addition to transaction price, and I expect the time on market will
be equal or longer when corporates sell their real assets. The hypothesis tested on this issue is provided
below.

H5: Market duration is not significantly different between divestitures of industrial assets made
by corporates and non-institutional investors.
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Property Types

Corporates are important occupiers of space in the industrial market and are influential user of industrial
properties to house their manufacturing activities. According to McKinley and Simpson (2005) and the
NAIOP Research Foundation, industrial property can be categorized into two main subcategories,
general-purpose and special-purpose properties9, based on the proposed purposes of use and the ease of
adaptation to alternative use. The differences between general- and special-purpose properties are
manifold. First, general-purpose properties are substitutable assets while special-purpose properties have
few substitutes. Second, as McKinley and Simpson (2005) pointed out that, for special-purpose properties,
the investment value is more likely to be used as the reference of the property value, in contrast to the
estimated market value used as reference for the general-purpose properties. Third, general-purpose
properties tend to have a greater number of interested investors due to their income-generating and
relative risk characteristics while special-purpose properties tend to attract owner- occupiers or end users
who desire to house a specific function of their operations.

According to McKinley and Simpson (2005), unlike other markets dominated by substitutable assets,
such as housing market, non-real estate corporations may have a better understanding of the investment
value of an industrial property than real estate investors who are non-users. Consequently, corporates are
not necessarily disadvantaged parties as they are in other markets. If market values are easily obtained, it
can mitigate the price differentials among investor clienteles. For special-purpose industrial properties,
market values are not easily obtained; thus, stronger investor clientele effects are expected for these assets.
The hypotheses examining this issue are provided below:

H6a: Given transactions in similar general-purpose industrial assets, corporates buy at similar
prices as compared to non-institutionals.
H6b: Given transactions in similar general-purpose industrial assets, corporates sell at similar
prices as compared to non-institutionals.
H7a: Given transactions in similar special-purpose industrial assets, corporates buy at similar
prices as compared to non-institutionals.
H7b: Given transactions in similar special-purpose industrial assets, corporates sell at similar
prices as compared to non-institutionals.
9

To clarify, single-purpose properties are part of special-purpose properties. Sometimes people use single-purpose properties
directly, but they are also special-purpose properties. According to McKinley and Simpson (2005), single-purpose property can
be seen as “a special-purpose property classification, some real estate is usually designed for a single-purpose use that typically is
not feasible to adapt to other purposes, and the market for these facilities is not confined to narrow geographic boundaries.” Also,
see the appendix for detailed information on the National Association for Industrial and Office Parks (NAIOP) classification.

12

Brokerage Intermediation Effects

Although price differences among investor groups may result internally from different considerations
related to investors’ unique characteristics and backgrounds, external forces may mitigate or exacerbate
these effects. The literature has documented the existence of market inefficiency induced by investor
clienteles. However, this inefficiency may be mitigated or exacerbated by the impact of brokerage
intermediation when involved in the transaction. According to Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005),
brokers play a more important role than any other third party in real estate transactions. They are involved
in almost every phase of the transaction, from determining the listing price, searching, matching, and
bargaining, to obtaining mortgages and closing the deal. As one of the most important parties in real
estate transactions, the involvement of brokers has a significant impact on the transaction price.

Since the pioneering work of Yinger (1981), research focus on real estate brokerage has grown
significantly. Researchers have intensively studied many aspects of brokerage, such as brokers’ and
brokerage businesses’ characteristics, commission and compensation, price and time on market, market
efficiency and legal liability, and international comparisons10. However, previous studies mainly focus on
the residential real estate market. Compared to investors in the residential real estate market, those in the
industrial market are usually more powerful and knowledgeable, and the transactions are more likely to
rely on the investment value instead of the estimated market value. Thus, it seems the brokers’ role in
industrial market might be mainly to facilitate a transaction rather than help their principals to obtain a
better deal. However, the absence of a market value could potentially create an agency problem for
brokers in the industrial market because reference points to gauge their behavior are difficult to obtain.
Without market value as a benchmark, brokers may be better positioned to influence with their principals,
such as persuading sellers to sell at a lower price or suggesting that buyers accept a higher price in order
to earn a commission faster. In order to obtain more accurate results on transaction price differences
between corporates and non-institutionals, brokerage intermediation effects are appropriately controlled
for when investor clienteles are examined. The related hypotheses tested in this study are shown below:

10

For example, one stream of the brokerage literature, close to this study, focuses on the impact that brokerage can have on
transactions and the potential agency issue with a dual agent. For example, Jud and Frew (1986) find, examining the role of real
estate brokers in the housing market in Charlotte, North Carolina, that broker-assistant sellers can sell at a higher price. However,
Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla (2000) examine the effect of using buyer brokers on the selling price. They find that buyer brokers
can reduce search time but have no effect on the selling price. Gardiner, Heisler, Kallberg, and Liu (2007) examine the effects of
dual agency on the selling price and TOM. They find that dual agency reduces both the selling price and TOM, and that both
effects were reduced after the disclosure legislation came into effect.
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H8a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates buy at similar prices as compared
to non-institutionals with brokerage intermediation effects controlled.
H8b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, corporates sell at similar prices as compared
non-institutionals with brokerage intermediation effects controlled.

Selection Bias
Sample selection bias, introduced by Heckman (1979) in his paper “Sample Selection Bias as a
Specification Error,” has caught the serious attention of research scholars. Long after its introduction, the
problem of selection bias has now been fully recognized and controlled for in real estate studies.
Considering the characteristics of industrial property, sample selection bias can be a serious problem, as
evidenced in several studies in the literature. On the one hand, as pointed out by McKinley and Simpson
(2005), “The market for industrial real estate reflects the unique characteristics of the property type.” For
example, investors are reluctant to take a facility that is designed to house a specific industrial process,
because such special-purpose industrial real properties are less likely to be adaptable to alternative uses. If
they are willing to select a special-purpose asset, a large capital expenditure is typically required to
convert the asset to a usable form. On the other hand, Wiley (2012) points out that some investors, such
as non-real estate corporations, may systematically overpay when they transact in commercial real estate.
Other sophisticated investors, such as institutionals who can easily access the capital market, and even
some less-sophisticated investor clienteles may influence the magnitude of overpayment. To present an
unbiased estimation, self-selection bias needs to be addressed before testing clientele effects, as suggested
by Wiley (2012). This study tests the following hypotheses using a probit model to detect the sample
selection problem.

H9a: The properties purchased by corporates are similar to those purchased by non-institutionals.
H9b: The properties sold by corporates are similar to those sold by non-institutionals.

2.2 Magnitude of Difference

Each of the aforementioned theories and potential explanations are carefully evaluated and examined to
answer the question on the price difference between corporates and non-institutional investors. The
question on the magnitude of these price differences among corporations is studied in the following parts.
Discussed below are several factors that can be identified and tested to explain the magnitude of
differences among corporate investors.
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Firm Size

Company size is probably the first determinant of the magnitude of price differences between transactions
of different companies.

Several reasons have been presented in the literature explaining why companies of different size pay
different prices when transacting in the real estate market. For example, Stoll (1984) points out that,
compared to small firms, large firms usually have lower credit costs and more funding sources, so large
companies can afford to pay a premium in order to outbid smaller competitors. In another study,
Audretsch and Elston (2000) show that relatively large companies have lower liquidity constraints since
larger companies can finance capital expenditures from internal resources, such as issuing equity or debt.
Moreover, Manning and Roulac (1999) point out that large companies can achieve lower costs from large
volume, spreading certain central administrative and operating costs over a large numbers of workers,
spreading costs of highly specialized expertise over larger square footage of occupied business space, and
amortizing investments in systems, research, and strategic management less noticeably with higher annual
revenues. They also point out that larger companies have a lower overall cost of capital, greater financial
strength and accessibility to the public capital markets, higher affordability, and greater visibility that may
affect resale values. Overall, the aforementioned reasons generally point out that larger companies can
outbid smaller competitors for similar size assets. Larger companies are expected to pay a higher price
when they transact deals and can afford to sell at lower prices in divestitures. To test the impact of firm
size on market outcomes of real estate transactions by different companies, two hypotheses are proposed
and tested as follows:

H10a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, relatively large firms buy at similar prices as
compared to smaller firms.
H10b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, relatively large firms sell at similar prices as
compared to smaller firms.

Industry

The industry that encompasses the companies’ main business is probably the next determinant of the size
difference between the market outcomes of different companies’ transactions.
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As pointed out by Edwards and Ellison (2009), “Firms need property in order to generate turnover and
profits, and the degree of importance of this functional role of property in the business differs with each
organization.” Johnson and Keasler (1993) present an analysis of corporate real estate holdings based on
the industry sector and property subtypes for 1984 and 1991. They show that companies in different
industries and business sectors have different preferences for their real estate holdings. For example, they
find that in the year 1984, the top five industry groups, based on absolute real estate holdings at cost, were
transportation equipment (SIC 3700), chemicals and allied products (SIC 2800), industrial and
commercial machinery and computer equipment (SIC 3500), electrical and other equipment excluding
computer equipment (SIC 3600), and paper and allied products (SIC 2600). In 1991, the top five industry
groups based on real estate holdings as a percentage of assets were primary metal industries (SIC 3300),
general merchandise stores (SIC 5300), paper and allied products (SIC 2600), chemicals and allied
products (SIC 2800), and printing and publishing (SIC 2700).
In another study, Schaefers (1999) highlights differences in companies’ attitudes and efforts toward real
estate asset management across different industries. He shows that heavy manufacturing/engineering,
retail/wholesale, and banking/insurance/services companies select real estate in strategic locations and are
more likely to actively manage their real estate assets. Companies in energy/utility/mining, chemical and
associated, and light manufacturing industries are less attentive to their real estate assets and more likely
to passively manage their real estate portfolio.

The apparent differences in the importance and ownership of real estate among different industries imply
that the estimated investment value of a real asset would differ by company and sector. Therefore, I can
reasonably expect that the price a company is willing to pay for a transaction would differ by sector and
industry11.

11

According to Nasdaq (http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx), the sectors and industries in which
firms conduct business are as follows: basic industry (major chemicals, agricultural chemicals, metal fabrications, mining &
quarrying of nonmetallic mineral, precious metals, steel/iron ore, engineering & construction, homebuilding, paints/coatings,
forest products, paper); capital goods (aerospace, auto manufacturing, auto parts: O.E.M., automotive aftermarket, building
materials, construction/ag equipment/trucks, electrical products, electronic components, industrial machinery/components,
pollution control equipment); consumer durables (consumer electronics/appliances, containers/packaging, home furnishings,
industrial specialties, miscellaneous manufacturing industries); consumer non-durables (apparel, beverages
[production/distribution], farming/seeds/milling, meat/poultry/fish, package goods/cosmetics, packaged foods, specialty foods,
plastic products); consumer services (advertising, clothing/shoe/accessory stores, department/specialty retail stores, office
equipment/supplies/services), energy (coal mining, industrial machinery/components), finance (consumer services, life insurance,
savings institutions, major banks), health care (major pharmaceuticals, medical specialties, medical/dental instruments),
miscellaneous (industrial machinery/components, publishing), public utilities (environmental services, telecommunications
equipment), technology (computer manufacturing, diversified commercial services, electrical products, industrial
machinery/components, semiconductors), and transportation (air freight/delivery services, marine transportation, trucking
freight/courier services).
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H11a: Corporates in different industries buy industrial assets at similar prices.
H11b: Corporates in different industries sell industrial assets at similar prices.

Locality and Its Impact

Another important characteristic that affects transaction price is locality, which has recently received
increased attention in the real estate literature.
As the literature shows12, the locality issue has been studied extensively for residential and commercial
office markets, but as pointed out earlier in this study, its impact in the industrial market could be
different. As aforementioned, many industrial properties serve and compete in a relatively large
geographic area, and their investment values are determined from a broader perspective that combines the
geographic dimension with various production factors, such as access to labor and natural resources,
transportation, and business clustering.

Dunse, Jones, Brown, and Fraser (2005) point out those industrial properties generally serve a broader
area such as a regional or national market instead of just a local market. Similarly, Thrall (2002) shows
that, in contrast to other markets where demand arises from the local economy, the demand for industrial
property is the result of larger national or even global considerations. As a result, the impact of localityinduced investor clientele effects in industrial property markets is different compared with other markets.
For example, information on value determinants may not be limited to a narrowly defined market
boundary. An industrial property can be evaluated according to the views of corporates within an
industrial corridor across several states. In this regard, the investment value is determined with broader

12

The earliest work in this area was conducted by Vrooman (1978). He points out, finding that a premium was paid by nonlocal
buyers for forestland parcels in the Adirondack Park, that the overpayment comes from a combination of information asymmetry
and anchoring. After Vrooman, out-of-market premium paid by nonlocal buyers has been studied extensively in the residential
real estate market although the empirical evidence is mixed. Miller, Sklarz, and Real (1988) find that Japanese buyers paid
significantly high prices in the Hawaiian residential real estate market during the 1980s. However, Myer, He, and Webb (1992)
find no evidence of a non-U.S. buyer premium. Further, Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) find that, compared to local buyers, out-oftown buyers do not pay significantly different prices in the housing market of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In a later study, Watkins
(1998) finds no evidence that in-migrants pay a premium compared with intra-market movers. In contrast to the work of Myer,
He, and Webb (1992), Turnbull and Sirmans (1993), Watkins (1998), and Neo, Ong, and Tu (2008) study the acquisitions made
by foreign investors and find that a significant premium has been paid by foreigners for low-rise houses in the Singapore housing
market. Further, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012) find that inter-market movers pay different prices to those of intra-market movers
for single-family house transactions and that inter-market movers suffer from disadvantages of information asymmetry and a
diminishing anchoring effect. In addition, Zhou, Gibler, and Zahirovic-Herbert (2014) examine new condominium sales in
Chengdu, China, and find that nonlocal buyers pay a higher price and are subject to the anchoring effect. Moreover, nonlocally
induced clientele effects have been investigated in the commercial real estate market. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004) find
that out-of-market buyers pay a significant premium for apartment complexes in the Phoenix area. Further, Liu, Gallimore, and
Wiley (2013) find that nonlocal investors pay a significant premium when purchasing and sell at a significant discount when
divesting. Such investors also experience information asymmetry and the anchoring effect.
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considerations in terms of geographic dimensions or production factors, such as access to labor and
natural resources, transportation, and business clustering. Therefore, if the investment value of an
industrial property is estimated in the context of a relatively large area with broadly distributed factors,
the locality impact could be diluted. In addition, compared to other real estate markets for certain property
types, such as general-purpose industrial property, it has a shorter development period and a relatively
simple construction structure. Therefore, nonlocal and local investors may rely on the same information
beyond a narrowly defined market boundary, in relative terms, in order to estimate the value of a property
with less information asymmetry; thus, the impact of locality could be different compared to the impact in
other markets. In this study, the price difference induced by locality is examined when corporate investors
transact in the industrial market. The following hypotheses are tested.

H12a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, non-local corporates buy at similar prices as
compared to locals.
H12b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, non-local corporates sell at similar prices as
compared to locals.

Public vs. Non-Public Firms

Firms can choose to fund their investment and operations from different sources. They can choose to keep
business running as private firms and raise capital from private equity funds. Alternatively, they can
choose to go public to enjoy the benefits of increased access to capital markets and increased liquidity for
shareholders. The advantages and disadvantages to a firm that goes public have been well documented in
the finance literature. For example, as Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan (2014) and Brigham and Houston
(2011) point out, the advantages of being a public company may include increased liquidity due to easier
transfer of ownership and fund-raising in the secondary market, enhanced credibility and improved terms
with customers, suppliers, and lenders, and increased public awareness and drawing power to customers.
On the other hand, the disadvantages of being public include high regulation and processing costs,
reduced confidentiality, flexibility, and control. In addition, the decision of going public and the choice of
being in public or private structures have also been intensively discussed in the literature. Studies
focusing on these topics include Shah and Thakor (1988), Zingales (1995), Pagano and Roell (1998),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), Ritter and Welch (2002), Boot,
Gopalan, and Thakor (2006), and Brau and Fawcett (2006), among others. Compared to private firms,
public firms often have better access to capital with a lower cost, so public firms are able to pay a higher
price to win a competitive bid. For these reasons, the following hypotheses are provided.

18

H13a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, public corporates buy at similar prices as
compared to non-public firms.
H13b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, public corporates sell at similar prices as
compared to non-public firms.

3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

The data used in this study are from two sources: data of property transactions are from the CoStar
COMPs® database, and data of public companies are from NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX.

CoStar is one of the leading information providers for commercial real estate transactions. The dataset
provides detailed and verified information for commercial property transactions in 138 major
metropolitan markets13 throughout the U.S. For each property, the information includes price per square
foot, land area, building size, building class, building address, transaction date, sale conditions14 as well as

13

A total of 138 markets are identified on CoStar. The markets are Albany/Schenectady/Troy, Albuquerque, Anchorage;
Asheville, Atlanta, Augusta/Richmond County, Austin, Bakersfield, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, Beaumont/Port Arthur,
Birmingham, Boise City/Nampa, Boston, Bremerton/Silverdale, Brownsville/Harlingen, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, Charleston WV,
Charleston/N Charleston, Charlotte, Chattanooga, Chicago, Cincinnati/Dayton, Cleveland, Colorado Springs, Columbia,
Columbus, Columbus GA, Corpus Christi, Dallas/Ft Worth, Davenport/Moline/Rock Island, Deltona/Daytona Beach, Denver,
Des Moines, Detroit, Duluth, East Bay/Oakland, El Paso, Erie, Evansville, Fayetteville, Fayetteville/Springdale/Rogers. Fort
Smith; Fort Wayne, Fresno, Green Bay, Greensboro/Winston-Salem, Greenville/Spartanburg, Hampton Roads, Hartford, Hawaii,
Houston, Huntington/Ashland, Huntsville, Indianapolis, Inland Empire (California), Jackson, Jacksonville (Florida), Kansas City,
Killeen/Temple/Fort Hood, Kingsport/Bristol/Bristol, Knoxville, Lafayette, Las Vegas, Lexington/Fayette, Lincoln, Little
Rock/N Little Rock, Long Island (New York), Los Angeles, Louisville, Lubbock, Marin/Sonoma, McAllen/Edinburg/Pharr,
Memphis, Milwaukee/Madison, Minneapolis/St Paul, Mobile, Montgomery, Myrtle Beach/Conway, Nashville, New
Orleans/Metairie/Kenner, New York City, Northern New Jersey, Ocala, Oklahoma City, Olympia, Omaha/Council Bluffs,
Orange County (California), Orlando, Pensacola, Peoria, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Port St Lucie/Fort Pierce, Portland,
Portland/South Portland, Providence, Raleigh/Durham, Reno/Sparks, Richmond VA, Roanoke, Rochester, Sacramento, Salinas,
Salt Lake City, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, San Luis Obispo/Paso Robles, Santa Barbara/Sta Maria/Goleta, Santa
Cruz/Watsonville, Savannah, Seattle/Puget Sound, Shreveport/Bossier City, South Bay/San Jose, South Bend/Misawaka, South
Florida, Southwest Florida, Spokane, Springfield, St. Louis, Stockton/Modesto, Syracuse, Tallahassee, Tampa/St Petersburg,
Toledo, Tucson, Tulsa, Utica/Rome, Visalia/Porterville, Washington, DC, West Michigan, Westchester/So Connecticut, Wichita,
Wilmington, Yakima, and Youngstown/Warren/Boardman.
14
The list of possible sale conditions identified by CoStar includes 1031 exchange, assemblage, auction sale, bankruptcy sale,
build-to-suit, building contamination issue, building in shell condition, business value added, condo conversion, court appointed
sale, debt assumption, deed restriction, deferred maintenance, direct exchange, distress sale, double escrow, estate/probate sale,
excess land, exercise of option, expansion, ground lease (leased fee simple), ground lease (leasehold), high vacancy property,
historical site, land contract, lease option, note purchase, partial interest transfer, purchase by tenant, recapitalization,
redevelopment project, real estate owned (REO sale), rolling option/takedown, sale leaseback, short sale, and soil contamination
issues. An alternative approach is to include only transactions that occur under normal sale conditions.
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details of the buyer’s and seller’s companies, their addresses, the broker on the buyer’s and seller’s sides,
and investor type classification15.

Information on public companies is gathered from nasdaq.com, which provides information on all public
companies from the three major stock markets: NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX. Information is obtained
from NASDAQ for 3,132 companies, from NYSE for 3,259 companies, and from AMEX for 391
companies. Company information includes company name, transaction symbol, last sale price, market cap,
country, IPO year, business sector, industry, and company summary.

In the first step of the data collection, data are collected from the CoStar website under the category of
each corporate and non-institutional investor type and for the purchase and divestiture sides. During the
data collection process, I first select one type of investor on the purchase side. I then adjust the property
size from one square foot and gradually increase it to infinity to obtain all the transaction records that
satisfy my search criteria. Because CoStar allows no more than 500 observations to be downloaded each
time, several batches16 of data under one investor type are collected and then combined to compose the
full sample for each investor type. This procedure is repeated for each investor type to obtain all available
data. To test the impact on transaction prices from company characteristics, the data collected from
CoStar are matched and merged with data collected from Nasdaq.com based on the name of the company
and transaction date.

The full sample collected from CoStar for industrial transactions made by corporates and noninstitutionals includes 14,150 observations on the purchase side and 13,464 observations on the
divestiture side. Among the data, the purchases and divestitures made by corporates include 3,915 and
3,829 observations, respectively. Likewise, purchases and sales made by non-institutionals include 10,235
and 9,635 observations, respectively17. The sample applies to 138 U.S. markets from 1991 through 2012.

The summary statistics for the transaction samples are shown in Table 1-1. Panel A of Table 1 provides
the purchase sample, Panel B the sale sample, and Panel C the paired transactions. On the purchase side, a
15

Investor types listed in CoStar are bank/finance, corporate, national developer, regional developer, educational, endowment,
equity funds, government, individual, insurance, investment manager, listed fund, medical, nonprofit, other private, other
unknown institution, pension fund, private REIT, REIT, religious, REOC, sovereign, special, tenants, and trust.
16
For example, in the purchase sample, 35 batches of data under the category of corporates, 57 batches of data under the category
of individuals, and 28 batches of data under the category of developers are collected.
17
Because legal forms of business organization are important in this analysis, to get an accurate estimation, I eliminate the
observations that cannot be identified as corporates from their name. The method I used to double check if the observations under
the category of corporates are identifiable corporates is that I use the “search” function in excel to find the observations under the
category of corporates that have “Inc.” or “Corporation” in their name. Similarly, for non-institutional group, I eliminate the
investors whose names are missing from the sample.
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typical industrial building is 41,526 square feet, sitting on an 183,925-square-foot lot and over 33 years
old. While Class A buildings represent only 1% and Class B 35% of the sample, Class C account for the
majority, at 63%. The average transaction price in the purchase sample is $66.67 per square foot, and
corporate investors pay $68.06 per square foot compared to non-institutional investors, who pay, on
average, $66.14 per square foot. Corporate investors tend to acquire larger, newer buildings on larger lots,
more in Class A and B. Similarly, on the divesture side, a typical industrial building is 43,159 square feet,
sitting on a 195,937-square-foot lot and over 35 years old. While Class A buildings represent only 1% and
Class B 34% of the sample, Class C accounts for 66%. The average transaction price in the sales sample
is $70.60 per square foot. Corporate investors sell at $64.96 per square foot, and non-institutional
investors at $72.84 per square foot.

Industrial properties can further be divided into two main sub-categories: general-purpose property and
special-purpose property. The summary statistics for the transaction sample in each of these subcategories are shown in Table 2-1 and Table 3-1.

Panel A of Table 2-1 provides the purchase sample and Panel B the sale sample of general-purpose
property transactions. On the purchase side, a typical general-purpose industrial building is 44,054 square
feet, sitting on an 188,266-square-foot lot and over 33 years old. Only 2% of the sample is Class A, 36%
is Class B, and 62% is Class C. The average transaction price in the purchase sample is $63.68 per square
foot, with corporate investors paying $63.54 and non-institutional investors an average of $63.74 per
square foot. Corporate investors tend to buy larger, newer buildings on much larger lots, more of them in
Classes A and B. Similarly, on the divesture side, a typical industrial building is 45,871 square feet,
sitting on a 200,639-square-foot lot and over 34 years old. While Class A buildings represent only 1% and
Class B 35% of the sample, Class C account for 64%. The average transaction price in the sales sample is
$67.64 per square foot. Corporate investors sell at $61.00 per square foot, and non-institutional investors
at $67.64 per square foot.

Panel A of Table 3-1 provides the purchase sample and Panel B the sales sample of special-purpose
property transactions. On the purchase side, a typical special-purpose industrial building is 17,797 square
feet, sitting on a 141,997-square-foot lot and over 34 years old. While Class A buildings represent only
1% and Class B 24% of the sample, Class C account for the majority, at 74%. The average transaction
price in the purchase sample is $96.20 per square foot, with corporate investors paying $ 118.18 and noninstitutional investors an average of $88.63 per square foot. Corporate investors tend to buy larger, newer
buildings on larger lots, more of them Class A and B. Similarly, on the divesture side, a typical industrial
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building is 17,501 square feet, sitting on a 147,379 square foot lot and over 35 years old. While Class A
buildings represent only 1% and Class B 26% of the sample, Class C account for 73%. The average
transaction price in the sales sample is $98.17 per square foot. Corporate investors sell at $106.14 and
non-institutional investors at $95.00 per square foot.

The summary statistics provide evidence that tends to support the valuation difference between corporate
investors and non-institutional investors, especially for special-purpose properties. We can see from the
summary statistics that, as suggested by McKinley and Simpson (2005), industrial properties have more
value to corporates than to non-institutional investors. Furthermore, the values to non-institutional
investors decrease significantly, as property adaptability reduces.

Moreover, the summary statistics for all the samples suggest that investor clienteles are subject to a selfselection issue when they engage in transactions, and this selection bias needs to be controlled for before
the hypotheses are tested. To control for selection bias, a propensity score matching procedure is applied.
This correction of selection bias by using propensity score matching maximizes the randomization
assumption of the sample and eliminates the potential damage to causal inference. In the propensity score
matching procedure, I match each transaction made by corporates with the most similar transaction made
by the control group. Before matching, a probit model with control variables for the property
characteristics is used to calculate the probability of a transaction made by different investor groups. After
obtaining the propensity scores, the subsample is constructed by matching with transactions of the closest
scores. The matching process helps to ensure that observations that have similar distributions of
covariates and equal number of observations for subject and control groups in the analysis. Results from
the probit estimations for each of the subsamples are presented in Tables 1-2, 2-2, and 3-2.

3.2 Methodology

The methodology used to measure the differences in the market outcomes of transactions and clientele
effects is well established in the real estate literature. The model used in this study is based on such
research. As aforementioned, related research models can be found in work such as Vrooman (1978),
Dale-Johnson (1983), Miller, Sklarz, and Real (1988), Myer, He, and Webb (1992), Turnbull and Sirmans
(1993), Watkins (1998), Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003), Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004),
Wood and Tu (2004), Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006), Benjamin, Chinloy, Hardin, and Wu (2008),
Neo, Ong, and Tu (2008), Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2012), Wiley (2012), Chernobai and Chernobai (2013),
Liu, Gallimore, and Wiley (2013), and Zhou, Gibler, and Zahirovic-Herbert (2014). The conventional
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method used to examine clientele effects is to include an indicator variable in the regression model for the
various clienteles. The estimated coefficient of the indicator variable then measures the performance
difference among various investor clienteles. In addition, the control variables used in my analysis are
supported by existing studies in order to effectively isolate the pricing differential attributable to clientele
effects. These variables include property characteristics, geographic locations, sales conditions, and
market timing. For example, Ambrose (1990) finds that the asking price is a function of a group of
property characteristics such as building and land size. Fehribach, Rutherford, and Eakin (1993) add age,
tenant type (single versus multiple tenants) to the model, and find significant results. Lockwood and
Rutherford (1996) find that the most significant impact on property price is from parcel size. Black,
Wolverton, Warden, and Pittman (1997) examine the southeast region of the U.S. market and find that the
distance to a metropolitan area and building condition also contribute to the price equation. Jackson (2001)
considers environmental factors and finds that they have a significant impact on property price. Following
such research, I include each of these relevant control variables in the respective estimations.

However, many of the analyses in the literature potentially suffer from the problem of endogeneity or
sample selection bias. Quite commonly, selection bias is not empirically measured or controlled in prior
studies. For example, Wiley (2012) points out that some investors, such as non-real estate corporations,
may systematically overpay when making a commercial real estate transaction. Other more sophisticated
investors, such as institutional investors who can easily access capital markets, or some less-sophisticated
investor clienteles, may also affect the magnitude of overpayment. As suggested by Wiley (2012), selfselection bias needs to be addressed appropriately before testing clientele effects. In order to control for
selection bias and compare similar assets across my targeted subsamples, I apply a propensity score
matching procedure in addition to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.

The propensity score matching method, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), addresses the issue
of selection bias and is often used in studies when a randomization assumption is not a given. The
rationale behind the matching procedure is that I first calculate the likely outcome of each observation in
the treatment group and the control group, given certain characteristics, by using prediction models (such
as probit or logit models). Then, based on the calculated propensity scores, I match observations in the
treatment group with observations in the control group. The propensity score matching method became
popular in empirical research soon after its introduction and appears in studies such as Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1984, 1985), Rosenbaum (1989), Gu and Rosenbaum (1993), D’Agostino (1998), D’Agostino and
Rubin (2000), and Rubin (2004, 2007). Because of the contribution made by these statisticians and
researchers, the method has been developed to cover not only univariate but also multivariate dimensions
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with various matching algorithms; for example, matching can be done by using “the nearest available
neighbor, caliper, and radius matching methods with or without replacement and matching treated
observations to one or many controls” (Coca-Perraillon, 2007). The nearest available neighbor matching
method without replacement is used to obtain the most accurate matching results.

The results from summary statistics suggest that selection bias issues are present in each sample. To
resolve this bias, a propensity score matching procedure is applied. I match each transaction by a
corporate investor with the most similar transaction by a non-institutional investor. A large number of
variables controlling for the property characteristics are used to measure the probability that the noninstitutional investor transaction is similar to a corporate investor transaction by the probit model. The
probit model for this is specified in Equation (1).

(1)

Pr{Corporate = 1} = Φ{β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM}.

The binary dependent variable, Corporate, is used on the left-hand side of the equation, taking on a value
of one for corporate investors and zero for non-institutional investors. I perform the probit estimation for
both the purchase and sales samples separately, controlling for property characteristics (X) and other
indicator variables, including secondary property type (T), calendar year of the transaction date (Y),
unique set of sale conditions (C), and metropolitan market (M). The set of property characteristics (X)
includes land area, building size, property age, and property class. Because industrial property is highly
heterogeneous, 10 distinct secondary property types (T) are used to control for this heterogeneity.
Calendar year indicators (Y) range from 1991 through 2012. CoStar identifies 36 individual sale
conditions, and the set of indicators for the unique sale conditions (C) represents each of the possible
combinations that appear in the samples. Also represented in the two samples are 138 metropolitan
markets (M). The same approach is used to control for selection bias in both general- and special-purpose
property transaction subsamples.

Table 1-2 presents the probit estimation results. Panels A and B of Table 1-2 report the estimation for the
purchase and sales samples, respectively. The results in Panel A show that corporate buyers prefer
relatively large-size industrial buildings on recently developed lots. Panel B reveals that corporate sellers
are significantly more likely to divest larger, older, and lower class assets. Overall, corporate investors
prefer to have properties with intensive improvements instead of inefficient land usage. I use the
propensity score method without replacement to match each transaction by a corporate buyer (seller) to a
transaction by a non-institutional buyer (seller) based on the probability. After matching, the final sample
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on the purchase side includes 3,915 observations from each corporate and non-institutional investor, and
3,829 observations are evenly drawn from each side to compose the sales sample. Table 1 also reports the
summary statistics for the propensity score matched sample of non-institutional investors, where we can
see, through the matching procedure, that the selection bias on the transactions has been corrected.
Similar results can also be seen in Tables 2-2 and 3-2 for both general- and special-purpose subsamples.

Following the probit model in Equation (1), Equation (2) is used to identify whether corporate investors
pay or receive different prices. Propensity score matched samples are used in the estimation.

(2)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βN·I{Corporate investor}
+ ε.

The dependent variable is price per square foot, logged. The independent variables include a set of
property characteristics (X), along with indicator variables controlling for secondary property type (T),
calendar year (Y), sale conditions (C), and geographic market (M). I use Equation (2) to estimate for the
purchase and sales samples individually. I{Corporate investor} takes a value of one for transactions by
corporate investors and a value of zero for transactions by non-institutionals. The coefficient of βN
estimates percentage changes on price in transactions made by corporate investors versus noninstitutionals. Based on the theory, I expect the estimated coefficient for βN to be positive and significant
in the purchase sample and in the sales sample, with a similar pattern across general-and special-purpose
subsamples.

Corporate investors may hold a different valuation for similar assets. The next step in the analysis
attempts to identify the valuation difference between corporate investors and non-institutionals. I use
Equation (2) again with a paired transaction sample to estimate the valuation difference. The paired
transaction sample is composed of corporation-to-corporation transactions and transactions between noninstitutionals. I{Corporate investor} takes a value of one for transactions by corporate investors and a
value of zero for transactions by non-institutionals.

Moreover, the decision to purchase or divest of property may be influenced by market conditions. I divide
the purchase and sales samples into subsamples for the expansion and contraction periods. Contraction
begins in the first quarter of 2008 and continues through the second quarter of 2009. During this period,
quarterly GDP growth was negative in the U.S. Expansion is defined for pre-2008 transactions and those
that followed Q2 2009. I run Equation (2) under each period and on purchase and sales samples separately.
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The estimated coefficients of βN show the different pricing levels of transactions between corporate
investors and non-institutionals.

Along with transaction prices, marketing duration also contributes to industrial market equilibrium. I
consider the time of transactions to reveal seller skill and patience. The marketing duration model is
provided in Equation (3).

(3)

ln(Marketing duration) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βP·ln(Price per square
foot) + βN·I{Corporate investor} + ε.

The estimated coefficient for βN in equation (3) identifies the percentage difference in marketing duration
for properties sold by corporate investors relative to similar assets sold by non-institutionals.

Brokerage intermediation effects are controlled for in Equation (4). In the CoStar database, I am able to
differentiate between buying brokers and listing brokers. The buyer and seller of commercial real estate
can have a dedicated buying broker and listing broker to represent the buyer’s and seller’s interests
separately. Without controlling for the possible impact of using a broker, the market outcomes from
different investor clienteles might be biased.

(4)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βN·I{Corporate investor}
+ βBB·I{Buyer broker} + βSB· I{Same broker18}+ βLB·I{Listing broker} + ε.

Equation (4) extends Equation (2) by adding dummy variables for broker usage. The estimated coefficient
for βN in Equation (4) identifies percentage difference in price per square foot for properties bought or
sold by corporate investors, with buying broker, same broker, or listing broker impacts controlled for,
relative to similar assets bought or sold by the control group.

In addition, the magnitudes of price differences based on the characteristics of firms are tested by the
following equations.

Equation (5) is used to test the magnitudes of price difference between public and non-public corporations.

18

Same broker is dual agent
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(5)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βP·I{Public corporation}
+ ε.

In Equation (5), the estimated coefficient for βP shows the percentage transaction price difference for
properties bought or sold by public firms relative to similar assets bought or sold by non-public
corporations.

Equation (6) is used to test the magnitudes of price difference between local and non-local corporations.

(6)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βL·I{Local corporation}
+ ε.

In Equation (6), the estimated coefficient for βL shows the percentage difference in transaction prices
between properties bought or sold by local firms and similar assets bought or sold by non-local
corporations.

Equation (7) is used to test the magnitudes of price difference among corporations in different industries.

(7)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βI·I{Industry} + ε.

In Equation (7), the estimated coefficient for βI shows the percentage difference in transaction price
between properties bought or sold by corporations operating in different industries. A total of 12
industries are tested.

Equation (8) is used to test the magnitudes of price difference based on firm size.

(8)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βCap·MarketCap + ε.

In Equation (8), the estimated coefficient for βCap shows the percentage difference in transaction price for
properties based on the corporation’s market capitalization.
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4. Empirical Results

The main results of this study are shown in Table 1-3. Panel A shows the purchase sample estimations,
and Panel B shows the results of the sales sample with selection bias controlled. The results indicate that
corporate investors overpay by an estimated 12.4% when purchasing but sell at no discount relative to the
prices of similar assets transacted by non-institutional investors.

To get a more accurate estimation, the impact of brokerage representation is considered. Table 4 shows
the results controlled for the involvement of brokers. The results, with brokerage intermediation effects
controlled for, show a consistent pattern of overpayment.

Similar price difference patterns can be found under different market conditions. Table 5 provides the
results for expansion in Panel A and contraction in Panel B. Panels A.1 and B.1 respectively reveal that
corporates pay premiums of 13.9% during expansion and 9.8% during contraction when acquiring
properties; a higher premium is paid during expansion than in the contraction period19. Panels A.2 and
Panel B.2 show that no discount appears in the sale of properties during the expansion and contraction
periods.

As shown in Table 2-3 and Table 3-3, the estimated coefficients for corporate investors are again
consistent in sign and significance across the general- and special-purpose property markets, where they
pay premiums of 11.1% and 20.8%, respectively. From the results, the premium paid by the corporates is
much higher in the special-purpose market than in the general-purpose market20.

Differences in asset valuation by corporate investors are reported in Table 6. The difference is estimated
by Equation (2) with a subsample of observations of transactions between corporate investors matched to
transactions between their non-institutional counterparts in similar assets. The estimated coefficient for
corporate investors indicates that they significantly overvalue similar assets by an estimated 7.2% relative
to non-institutionals. The property overvaluation by corporate investors accords with our expectation,

)/

)=22.18

)/

)=33.12

19

20
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considering that corporate investors see the property not only as an investment but also as a business
necessity.

In addition to price effects, Table 7 shows the estimation for marketing duration for the sales sample only.
The estimation reveals that, everything being equal, marketing durations do not significantly differ
between corporate investors and non-institutional investors. The impatience demonstrated in the office
market does not appear pronounced in the industrial market. The lack of speculative opportunity may help
explain this phenomenon. As pointed out by McKinley and Simpson (2005), “Industrial buildings take a
relatively short time to build, and when vacancy rates are low, the amount of construction can increase
quickly, so it no longer makes financial sense to build speculatively. The industrial market can respond
much more quickly to demand changes than other real estate markets.” In addition, the industrial market
is thinly traded, and lacks easily observed investment values. Using industrial property for speculative
purposes is a high-risk undertaking. Thus, even though corporates are willing to sell their properties
quicker for a lower price, the market does not provide such an opportunity from the demand side.
Therefore, we find no difference in market duration.

Tables 1 through 7 provide us a better understanding of the price difference between transactions by
corporate and non-institutional investors. I next examine the impact of the corporations’ characteristics on
the size of the premium.

Table 8 shows that larger corporates do not pay a higher price than smaller corporations do; neither do
they sell at a lower price than smaller corporations do as capital alone increases. However, Table 9-3
shows that public corporations do pay a higher price than non-public corporations do when transacting in
the industrial market. The results may imply that greater capital accessibility and liquidity do play a role
in variation of the overpayment. In addition, Table 10-3 shows that nonlocal corporations pay a higher
price during acquisition, which is consistent with the literature. Moreover, Table 11 shows that public
utilities, technology firms, and transportation companies are more likely to pay or sell at a higher price
when compared to companies in the basic industries. On the other hand, corporations involved in
consumer durables, consumer goods, energy, health-care, and miscellaneous purchase at a higher price
but appear to sell at a price that is no different from similar assets. In addition, capital, finance, and
consumer non-durable companies neither pay nor sell at a different price than those in basic industries.21
21

I admit this is the limitation of this study, and Table 11 only provides informative results. The rationale behind the results I can
see might be that the differences in degree of importance of this functional role of property in the business as suggested out by
Edwards and Ellison (2009), or different preferences for their real estate holdings as pointed out by Johnson and Keasler (1993).
Further study can be done in this area in the future.
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4.1 Robustness Checks

To evaluate the robustness of the empirical results, clustering effects are considered in addition to
propensity score matching. Moulton (1986, 1990) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2002) point out
the importance of controlling for clustering effects since a failure to do so may cause an underestimation
of the standard errors and overstate the corresponding t value. Many studies discuss methods to control
for clustering effects—Liang and Zeger (1986), Rogers (1994), Wooldridge (2003), Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2008), and White (2014), for example. In order to ensure robustness, all the results are
conducted with standard errors clustered by geographic locations and market timings. Table 12 provides
the corrected results, which show a consistent buy-high but not sell-low pattern in the industrial market.

5. Conclusion

Investor heterogeneity in specialized market knowledge, experiences, and origination drive investors into
different classifiable groups. These unique clientele characteristics in turn show a significant impact on
asset pricing through estimation of the property’s investment value. In this study, I focus on transaction
price differences between corporates and non-institutional investors in the industrial market for property
acquisitions or divestitures. I evaluate the transaction price on both the purchase and divesture sides to
check for any difference between the two prices. If a difference does exist, what are the factors that
determine its magnitude?

In this study, I find that corporate investors in industrial property buy high but do not sell low. The pattern
of buying high but not selling low does not support the claim by Bender (1991) that the management of a
corporation typically disposes of real estate when it has surplus property to sell in the industrial market.
However, the results do echo the claim of Bender (1991) that knowing the property value is vital to avoid
selling at a lower price. For example, from table 1-3 and table 6 we can see that corporates do have a
higher valuation on industrial real properties, and they do not sell their property at lower price. This study
also provides some empirical evidence to verify the conflicting survey findings of Nourse and Kingery
(1987) that while half of the businesses ignore the opportunities to divest their surplus properties at a
better price, the other half try to maximize shareholder value by selling at a higher price. The results from
table 1-3 generally show that corporates do not sell at significant different price than their counterparts in
industrial market.
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The pattern of buy high but do not sell low in industrial market differs from office market, and it is
consistent during market cycles and across general- and special-purpose property types. The differences
from office markets could be ascribed to a combination of higher investment value of corporates and the
characteristics of industrial real properties. As pointed out by Wheaton and Torto (1990), industrial real
properties are more likely to be owner-occupied, have a shorter development period, and are more likely
to be built for the user. Investment for speculative rental purposes is limited in the industrial markets, and
single tenant properties dominate the rental market. Due to the characteristics of industrial properties,
market value sometimes is not easily to obtain and to be used to mitigate the price differentials among
investor clienteles, and the cyclical effects in industrial market are weak. As a result, corporation’s
behavior and performance are different in industrial market. The findings generally suggest that corporate
buyers pay a premium when purchasing, and a large portion of the premium is attributable to higher
valuations applied by corporate investors. However, in divestiture, the asset market is unaffected by what
the corporation believes the property is worth for investment value. In the absence of another buyer who
holds similar valuation for the asset, it is difficult to recover any of their overpayment in the selling price
at the end of the holding period. When compared to transactions in office market, corporate sellers in the
industrial market are more patient and do not require significantly shorter marketing periods. The
lengthier time to sale in the industrial market reduces the disparity between prices received by other
investors in divestitures. The magnitude of overpayment is correlated with corporate characteristics.
Public corporations and nonlocal corporations tend to pay more than local and private corporates, with the
magnitude of overpayment varied across industrial sectors. However, the size of the corporation, in terms
of market capitalization, has no impact on the degree of overpayment. The results reflect a higher cost of
real capital to corporates22, and generally imply that the price a corporate is willing to pay is determined
primarily from an overall business value perspective, rather than property market value.

22

The real capital here is defined as assets used to produce goods, such as real estate, equipment and machinery. Cost of real
capital is just the cost of acquisition price over real property, the transaction price. Different from cost of capital, which is defined
as the minimum required return on a new investment. In this study, I only focus on the price difference.
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Table 1-1. Summary Statistics Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate buyer

Full Sample
(n=14,150)
Mean
Std dev
66.67
183,925
41,526
33.5
0.01
0.35
0.63
0.40
0.28

59.89
556,088
91,088
21.71
0.12
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.45

Corporate
(n=3,915)
Mean
Std dev
68.06
284,697
63,891
30.91
0.03
0.41
0.57
0.38
1

66.06
787,837
132,804
19.50
0.16
0.49
0.50
0.49
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=10,235)
Mean
Std dev
57.35
429,858
66,794
22.42
0.12
0.47
0.47
0.49
0

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=3,915)
Mean
Std dev
60.05
53.67
253,056
561,783
58,008
95,143
31.54
21.47
0.02
0.15
0.40
0.49
0.57
0.49
0.39
0.49
0
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=9,635)
Mean
Std dev

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=3,829)
Mean
Std dev

66.14
145,378
32,972
34.53
0.01
0.33
0.66
0.41
0

Panel B. Sales sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate seller
Marketing duration

Full Sample
(n=13,464)
Mean
Std dev
70.60
195,937
43,159
35.17
0.01
0.34
0.65
0.39
0.28
445.49

66.20
586,336
99,086
21.81
0.11
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.45
417.98

Corporate
(n=3,829)
Mean
Std dev
64.96
322,679
69,948
34.43
0.02
0.39
0.58
0.38
1
485.00

66.00
785,778
134,378
20.79
0.15
0.49
0.49
0.49
0
445.09

72.84
145,569
32,513
34.43
0.01
0.32
0.67
0.42
0
429.93

66.15
475,572
78,400
20.79
0.10
0.47
0.47
0.47
0
405.79

63.56
257,534
58,620
34.97
0.02
0.38
0.60
0.38
0
465.38

60.30
658,978
116,960
21.70
0.13
0.49
0.49
0.48
0
429.52

Panel C. Paired transactions
Full Sample
Corporate
Non-institutional:
Non-institutional:
(n=5,043)
(n=793)
pre-match (n=4,250)
post-match (n=793)
Variable
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
67.33
58.97
62.76
64.61
68.53
57.33
54.02
48.45
Price per square foot ($)
189,736
568,096
406,708
951,218 132,337
391,385
309,013
568,184
Land area (SF)
84,260
184,001
29,285
67,194
67,216
99,638
Building size (SF)
40,785
105,583
37.36
21.54
33.47
18.70
38.38
22.12
34.35
20.09
Property age (years)
0.01
0.10
0.02
0.13
0.01
0.09
0.02
0.13
Class A
0.34
0.47
0.46
0.50
0.31
0.46
0.44
0.50
Class B
0.65
0.48
0.53
0.50
0.69
0.46
0.55
0.50
Class C
Multi-tenant
0.38
0.49
0.35
0.48
0.39
0.49
0.35
0.48
0.16
0.41
Corporate investors
1
0
0
0
0
0
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the purchase sample, in Panel A, the sales sample, in Panel B, and the subsample of
paired transactions, in Panel C. The first column lists the variable name. The subsequent columns report the sample mean (Mean) and
standard deviation (Std dev) for the full sample, the subsample of transactions by Corporate investors, the subsample of transactions
by Non-institutional investors before (pre-match) and after the propensity-score matching (post-match) sequentially.
Variable definitions: Price per square foot is the transaction price for the industrial property, in U.S. dollars, divided by building size.
Land area is the gross square footage of the lot. Building size is the rentable building area, measured in square foot (SF). Property
age is measured in years relative to the sale date. Class A, Class B and Class C are indicator variables taking on a value of one for the
respective property class and zero otherwise. Corporate buyer and corporate seller are indicator variables, taking on a value of one if
the property is bought or sold by corporate buyer (seller). Marketing duration is the time to sell the property from the date of listing,
measured in calendar days.
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Table 1-2. Probit Estimation, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Panel A1. Probit for corporate buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-7.998
0.00
Constant
0.093 ***
39.41
ln(land area)
0.164 ***
94.61
ln(building size)
***
-0.060
12.67
ln(property age)
-0.148
2.44
Class A
0.012
0.19
Class B
-0.069 ***
8.17
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [79 variables]
Market indicators23:
Included [134 variables]
pseudo-R2:
7.29%
Observations:
14,150

Panel B1. Probit for corporate seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
***
-3.111
45.86
Constant
0.097 ***
43.01
ln(land area)
0.183 ***
116.49
ln(building size)
0.045 **
6.10
ln(property age)
0.116
1.18
Class A
0.063 **
5.11
Class B
-0.068 ***
7.37
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [59 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [131 variables]
pseudo-R2:
9.16%
Observations:
13,464

Panel A2. Probit for corporate buyer (post-match)
Panel B2. Probit for corporate seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-0.360
0.45
0.604
0.73
Constant
Constant
0.010
0.29
0.002
0.02
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
-0.012
0.31
0.026
1.57
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
0.023
1.22
-0.001
0.00
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.054
0.27
0.175
2.32
Class A
Class A
0.023
0.50
0.018
0.29
Class B
Class B
-0.014
0.22
-0.001
0.00
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [66 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [107 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [99 variables]
pseudo-R2:
0.78%
pseudo-R2:
1.05%
Observations:
7,830
Observations:
7,658
Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents the initial probit for the
buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation using the post-match samples to
confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is corporate buyer (seller), which has a value of one if the
property is bought (sold) by a corporate. The variables land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels
present the variables' names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the Wald Χ2 test statistics in the third.
All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicator variables to
control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 79 (59) indicators to control for unique sale
conditions, and 134 (131) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. After matching, the
estimation includes 9 (9) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of
transaction, 66 (48) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 107 (99) indicators to control for geographic property
markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding
Wald statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

23

Market indicators are indicators to control for geographic property markets

37

Table 1-3. Estimated Premiums, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
7.096 ***
23.57
8.177 ***
22.11
Constant
Constant
-0.075 ***
-7.21
-0.072 ***
-6.92
ln(Land area)
ln(Land area)
-0.227 ***
-19.44
-0.244 ***
-20.71
ln(Building size)
ln(Building size)
-0.203 ***
-17.36
-0.206 ***
-15.94
ln(Property age)
ln(Property age)
***
0.265
4.57
0.273 ***
4.13
Class A
Class A
0.096 ***
5.20
0.125 ***
6.59
Class B
Class B
***
***
-0.081
-4.85
-0.056
-3.22
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.124 ***
7.77
0.017
0.99
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [66 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [107 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [99 variables]
Adjusted R2:
30.87%
Adjusted R2:
30.38%
Observations:
7,830
Observations:
7,658
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples. Panel
A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
propensity-score matched seller sample. The variables Price per square foot, Land area, Building size and
Property age are each logged. The panels present the variable name in the first column, the estimated coefficient
in the second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation also includes indicators to control for secondary
property types, transaction years, sale conditions and markets, with one suppressed. *** and ** indicate statistical
significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t-statistic at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2-1. Summary Statistics, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (General-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate buyer

Full Sample
(n = 12,508)
Mean
Std dev
63.68
53.71
188,266
558,899
44,054
94,783
33.22
21.60
0.02
0.13
0.36
0.48
0.62
0.49
0.40
0.49
0.28
0.45

Corporate
(n=3,520)
Mean
Std dev
63.54
55.66
290,092
817,948
67,231
137,422
30.68
19.33
0.03
0.16
0.42
0.49
0.55
0.50
0.39
0.49
1
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=8,988)
Mean
Std dev
63.74
52.93
148,388
408,768
34,977
69,391
34.22
22.35
0.01
0.12
0.34
0.47
0.64
0.48
0.01
0.12
0
0

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=3,520)
Mean
Std dev
57.72
49.80
259,745
581,383
61,037
98,928
31.27
20.39
0.02
0.15
0.41
0.49
0.57
0.50
0.39
0.49
0
0

Full Sample
(n = 11,832)
Mean
Std dev
67.64
60.87
200,639
592,340
45,871
103,528
34.91
21.79
0.01
0.12
0.35
0.48
0.64
0.48
0.41
0.49
0.28
0.45

Corporate
(n=3,368)
Mean
Std dev
61.00
56.96
331,927
822,118
74,392
139,513
34.23
20.90
0.02
0.16
0.41
0.49
0.57
0.50
0.40
0.49
1
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=8,464)
Mean
Std dev
67.64
60.87
200,639
592,340
45,871
103,528
34.91
21.79
0.01
0.12
0.35
0.48
0.64
0.48
0.41
0.49
0
0

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=3,368)
Mean
Std dev
60.15
54.02
267,242
691,493
62,592
122,631
34.64
21.57
0.02
0.14
0.39
0.49
0.59
0.49
0.41
0.49
0
0

Panel B. Sales sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate seller

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the general-purpose subsample of the purchase sample in Panel A and the sales
sample in Panel B. The first column lists the variables' names. The subsequent columns report the sample means (Mean) and
standard deviations (Std dev) for the subsample of transactions by corporate investors and the subsample of transactions by noninstitutionals before (pre-match) and after (post-match) the propensity score matching, respectively.
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Table 2-2. Probit, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (General-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A1. Probit for nonlocal buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-8.214
0.00
Constant
0.083 ***
26.63
ln(land area)
0.178 ***
95.90
ln(building size)
***
-0.065
13.19
ln(property age)
**
-0.207
4.32
Class A
0.008
0.07
Class B
-0.069 **
5.23
Multi-tenant
Included
[5
variables]
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Included [79 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [131 variables]
Market indicators:
pseudo-R2:
7.16%
Observations:
12,508

Panel B1. Probit for nonlocal seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
***
-3.358
52.55
Constant
0.093 ***
33.42
ln(land area)
0.190 ***
107.47
ln(building size)
0.041 **
4.53
ln(property age)
0.143
1.64
Class A
0.067 **
5.17
Class B
-0.058 **
4.76
Multi-tenant
Included
[5
variables]
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Included [58 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [130 variables]
Market indicators:
pseudo-R2:
8.54%
Observations:
11,832

Panel A2. Probit for nonlocal buyer (post-match)
Panel B2. Probit for nonlocal seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
0.384
0.28
0.204
0.11
Constant
Constant
-0.002
0.01
0.013
0.42
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
0.004
0.03
0.005
0.04
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
0.012
0.28
0.007
0.08
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.106
0.90
0.175
2.27
Class A
Class A
0.031
0.79
0.033
0.88
Class B
Class B
-0.013
0.16
-0.028
0.77
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
Included [5 variables]
Secondary type indicators:
Secondary type indicators:
Included [5 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [64 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [46 variables]
Included [105 variables]
Market indicators:
Market indicators:
Included [94 variables]
pseudo-R2:
0.72%
pseudo-R2:
0.74%
Observations:
7,040
Observations:
6,736
Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents the initial probit for
the buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation using the post-match samples
to confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is nonlocal buyer (seller), which has a value of one if
the property is bought (sold) by a nonlocal. The variables land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels
present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the Wald Χ2 test statistics in the
third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes 5 (5) indicator
variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 79 (58) indicators to control
for unique sale conditions, and 131 (130) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. After
matching, the estimation includes 5 (5) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for
year of transaction, 64(46) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 105 (94) indicators to control for geographic
property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding Wald statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2-3. Estimated Premiums, Corporate vs. Non-institutional tors (General-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
6.824 ***
17.39
8.161 ***
23.79
Constant
Constant
-0.095 ***
-8.60
-0.105 ***
-9.33
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
***
***
-0.205
-16.70
-0.212
-16.52
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.228 ***
-19.02
-0.221 ***
-16.31
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
***
0.194
3.18
0.250 ***
3.78
Class A
Class A
0.098 ***
5.20
0.114 ***
5.74
Class B
Class B
-0.087 ***
-5.05
-0.065 ***
-3.52
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.111 ***
6.75
0.017
0.95
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
Second type indicators:
Included [5 variables]
Second type indicators:
Included [5 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [64 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [46 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [105 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [94 variables]
Adjusted R2:
31.02%
Adjusted R2:
29.70%
Observations:
7,040
Observations:
6,736
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
propensity score matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and
property age are each logged. The panels present the variables' names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 5 (5) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 64 (46) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 105 (94) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding
t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3-1. Summary Statistics, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (Specific-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate buyer

Full Sample
(n = 1,642)
Mean
Std dev
96.20
89.99
141,997
246,430
17,797
31,269
34.42
20.70
0.01
0.12
0.24
0.43
0.74
0.44
0.39
0.49
0.26
0.44

Corporate
(n=263)
Mean
Std dev
118.18
114.05
232,915
302,224
26,332
49,208
31.02
18.88
0.02
0.15
0.27
0.45
0.70
0.46
0.36
0.48
1
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=1,379)
Mean
Std dev
88.63
78.73
110,700
215,559
14,859
21,202
35.60
21.17
0.01
0.10
0.23
0.42
0.76
0.43
0.40
0.49
0
0

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=263)
Mean
Std dev
32.10
20.48
192,851
313,259
21,152
28,145
32.10
20.48
0.02
0.12
0.28
0.45
0.71
0.46
0.36
0.48
0
0

Full Sample
(n = 1,632)
Mean
Std dev
98.17
98.99
147,379
241,622
17,501
26,863
35.69
20.24
0.01
0.09
0.26
0.44
0.73
0.44
0.40
0.49
0.28
0.45

Corporate
(n=290)
Mean
Std dev
106.14
120.80
257,788
320,894
25,621
39,939
34.87
18.73
0.00
0.06
0.28
0.45
0.72
0.45
0.35
0.48
1
0

Non-institutional:
pre-match (n=1,342)
Mean
Std dev
95.00
88.72
103,397
184,216
14,266
18,402
36.02
20.81
0.01
0.10
0.25
0.43
0.74
0.44
0.42
0.49
0
0

Non-institutional:
post-match (n=290)
Mean
Std dev
94.43
95.19
180,534
255,097
21,208
25,166
35.27
20.80
0.00
0.00
0.26
0.44
0.74
0.44
0.37
0.48
0
0

Panel B. Sales sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Corporate seller

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the specific-purpose subsamples of the purchase sample in Panel A and the sales
sample in Panel B. The first column lists the variables' names. The subsequent columns report the sample means (Mean) and
standard deviations (Std dev) for the subsample of transactions by corporate investors and the subsample of transactions by noninstitutional before (pre-match) and after (post-match) the propensity score matching, respectively.
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Table 3-2. Probit, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (Specific-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A1. Probit for nonlocal buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
3.921
0.00
Constant
0.196 ***
12.24
ln(land area)
0.024
0.12
ln(building size)
-0.141 *
3.33
ln(property age)
0.420
0.88
Class A
0.028
0.05
Class B
-0.071
0.49
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators:
Included [2 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [50 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [67 variables]
pseudo-R2:
22.03%
Observations:
1,642

Panel B1. Probit for nonlocal seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
3.272
0.00
Constant
0.226 ***
14.48
ln(land area)
0.056
0.60
ln(building size)
0.051
0.35
ln(property age)
-0.413
0.44
Class A
0.059
0.22
Class B
-0.124
1.39
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators: Included [2 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [41 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [60 variables]
pseudo-R2:
30.09%
Observations:
1,632

Panel A2. Probit for nonlocal buyer (post-match)
Panel B2. Probit for nonlocal seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
4.554
0.00
5.564
0.00
Constant
Constant
-0.011
0.03
0.033
0.23
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
0.069
0.76
0.000
0.00
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.040
0.19
0.032
0.11
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.212
0.20
6.457
0.00
Class A
Class A
-0.021
0.02
0.079
0.32
Class B
Class B
0.002
0.00
-0.046
0.15
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
Secondary type indicators: Included [2 variables]
Secondary type indicators: Included [2 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [22 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [23 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [30 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [26 variables]
pseudo-R2:
6.15%
pseudo-R2:
11.73%
Observations:
526
Observations:
580
Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents the initial probit for the
buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation using the post-match samples to
confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is nonlocal buyer (seller), which has a value of one if the
property is bought (sold) by a nonlocal. The variables land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels
present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the Wald Χ2 test statistics in the third.
All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes 2 (2) indicator variables to
control for secondary property types, 9 (8) indicators to control for year of transaction, 50 (41) indicators to control for unique sale
conditions, and 67 (60) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. After matching, the estimation
includes 2 (2) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 7 (7) indicators to control for year of transaction, 22 (23)
indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 30 (26) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding Wald statistic at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3-3. Estimated Premiums, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (Specific-Purpose Subsamples)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity score matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity score matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
9.597 ***
11.04
6.958 ***
7.62
Constant
Constant
0.001
0.03
-0.002
-0.05
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
-0.359 ***
-7.97
-0.361 ***
-7.93
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.028
-0.53
-0.074
-1.33
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.381
1.38
1.584 *
1.76
Class A
Class A
-0.068
-0.82
0.004
0.05
Class B
Class B
-0.100
-1.41
-0.129 *
-1.88
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.208 ***
3.11
-0.024
-0.35
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators: Included [2 variables]
Secondary type indicators: Included [2 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [22 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [23 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [30 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [26 variables]
Adjusted R2:
27.62%
Adjusted R2:
29.20%
Observations:
526
Observations:
580
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity score matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
propensity score matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and
property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 3. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 2 (2) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 7 (7) indicators to control for year of transaction, 22 (23) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 30 (26) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed.
*** **
, , and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

44

Table 4. Estimated Premiums with Brokerage Intermediation, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
7.178 ***
24.17
8.206 ***
22.42
Constant
Constant
-0.066 ***
-6.36
-0.065 ***
-6.22
ln(Land area)
ln(Land area)
***
***
-0.244
-21.03
-0.255
-21.79
ln(Building size)
ln(Building size)
-0.195 ***
-16.89
-0.201 ***
-15.71
ln(Property age)
ln(Property age)
***
0.243
4.24
0.269 ***
4.13
Class A
Class A
0.090 ***
4.94
0.122 ***
6.53
Class B
Class B
-0.080 ***
-4.85
-0.052 ***
-3.01
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.113 ***
7.15
0.017
1.02
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
0.297 ***
14.39
-0.211 ***
-10.06
Buyer broker
List broker
-0.040 *
-1.68
-0.091 ***
-3.37
Same broker
Same broker
***
-0.191
-9.11
0.249 ***
11.55
List broker
Buyer broker
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [66 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [107 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [99 variables]
Adjusted R2:
34.50%
Adjusted R2:
33.43%
Observations:
7,830
Observations:
7,658
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples. Panel A
presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the propensityscore-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and property age are each
logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the t
statistics in the third. The t statistics and reported significance levels are based on standard errors clustered by market
and calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first
column, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicators to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for
year of transaction, 66 (48) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 107 (99) indicators to control for
geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Cyclical Premiums, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Panel A. Expansion
Panel A.1 Propensity-score-matched sample of buyers
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
7.698 ***
21.89
Constant
-0.082 ***
-7.53
ln(Land area)
***
-0.224
-18.25
ln(Building size)
-0.217 ***
-17.24
ln(Property age)
0.279 ***
4.35
Class A
0.123 ***
6.27
Class B
-0.094 ***
-5.32
Multi-tenant
0.139 ***
8.19
Corporate buyer
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [64 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [104 variables]
Adjusted R2:
30.65%
Observations:
6,998

Panel A.2 Propensity-score-matched sample of sellers
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
7.807 ***
23.80
Constant
-0.073 ***
-6.58
ln(Land area)
***
-0.245
-19.36
ln(Building size)
-0.212 ***
-15.09
ln(Property age)
0.324 ***
4.49
Class A
0.131 ***
6.50
Class B
-0.049 ***
-2.62
Multi-tenant
0.024
1.33
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [46 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [94 variables]
Adjusted R2:
29.90%
Observations:
6,690

Panel B. Contraction
Panel B.1 Propensity-score-matched sample of buyers
Panel B.2 Propensity-score-matched sample of sellers
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.292 ***
9.77
7.200 ***
7.18
Constant
Constant
0.016
0.43
-0.041
-1.35
ln(Land area)
ln(Land area)
-0.302 ***
-7.75
-0.296 ***
-8.59
ln(Building size)
ln(Building size)
***
-0.150
-4.23
-0.138 ***
-3.99
ln(Property age)
ln(Property age)
0.484 ***
2.63
0.191
1.05
Class A
Class A
0.027
0.44
0.081
1.45
Class B
Class B
**
-0.027
-0.48
-0.114
-2.24
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.098 *
1.85
-0.052
-1.05
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [1 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [1 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [24 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [28 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [44 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [37 variables]
Adjusted R2:
29.09%
Adjusted R2:
30.33%
Observations:
832
Observations:
968
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples for two
periods. Contraction begins in the first quarter of 2008 and continues through the second quarter of 2009. During this
period, quarterly GDP growth was negative in the U.S. Expansion is defined for pre-2008 transactions and those that
followed Q2 2009. Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched samples under expansion, (A.1 buyer
sample, and A.2 seller sample), while Panel B provides results for the propensity-score-matched samples under
contraction (B.1 buyer sample, and B.2 seller sample). The variables Price per square foot, Land area, Building size and
Property age are each logged. The table presents the variable name in the first column, the estimated coefficient in the
second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the
variables listed in the first column, the estimation also includes indicators to control for secondary property types,
transaction years, sale conditions, and markets, with one suppressed. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance of the
estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t-statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Valuation Differences, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.462 ***
5.35
Constant
0.011
0.28
ln(Land area)
-0.300 ***
-6.71
ln(Building size)
-0.282 ***
-6.17
ln(Property age)
0.394 *
1.73
Class A
0.050
0.76
Class B
-0.021
-0.33
Multi-tenant
0.072 *
1.93
Corporate investor
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [28 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [60 variables]
Adjusted R2:
18.82%
Observations:
1,586
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of
price per square foot. Propensity score matching is
performed again (results unreported) between
corporate investors and non-institutional investors
for transactions in comparable assets. Corporate
investor is an indicator variable for transactions
involving both a corporate buyer and corporate
seller, representing exactly one-half of the sample.
Transactions involving a corporate investor on only
one side of the transaction are excluded from the
sample. The variables Price per square foot, Land
area, Building size and Property age are each
logged. The table presents the variable name in the
first column, the estimated coefficient in the second,
and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. All
variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column,
the estimation also includes indicators to control for
secondary property types, transaction years, sale
conditions, and markets, with one suppressed. ***
and ** indicate statistical significance of the
estimated coefficient, based on the corresponding tstatistic at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Table 7. Marketing Duration, Sales Sample, Corporate vs. Non-institutional
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
5.163 ***
6.16
Constant
0.018
0.97
ln(Land area)
0.069 ***
3.24
ln(Building size)
*
0.045
1.92
ln(Property age)
-0.024
-0.20
Class A
0.137 ***
4.27
Class B
0.091 ***
3.09
Multi-tenant
-8.74
Logged price per square foot -0.180 ***
0.026
0.90
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [46 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [91 variables]
Adjusted R2:
10.67%
Observations:
4,775
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of
marketing duration for the sales sample of transactions.
Due to missing observations for the marketing duration
variable, sample transactions between corporates are
again propensity score matched (results unreported) with
comparable assets sold by non-institutional investors,
where marketing duration information is available. The
variables Marketing duration, Land area, Building size
and Property age are each logged. The table presents the
variable name in the first column, the estimated
coefficient in the second, and the t-statistic (in
parentheses) in the third. All variables are defined in the
notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the
first column, the estimation also includes indicators to
control for secondary property types, transaction years,
sale conditions, and markets, with one suppressed. ***
and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient, based on the corresponding t-statistic at the
1% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 8-1. Summary Statistics, Corporates Investors Only (Large vs. Small)
Purchase sample
(n = 312)
Mean

Sales sample
(n = 540)
Variable
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
57.00
63.67
Price per square foot ($)
90.57
104.14
Land area (SF)
646,866
1,695,277
639,449
1,217,652
Building size (SF)
132,014
273,031
132,579
194,753
Property age (years)
30.23
19.81
35.28
18.72
Class A
0.04
0.18
0.03
0.18
Class B
0.43
0.50
0.47
0.50
Class C
0.53
0.50
0.50
0.50
Multi-tenant
0.30
0.46
0.32
0.47
MarketCap ($)
26,349,707,849
58,672,397,518
26,474,306,522
52,112,514,438
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the purchase sample in Panel A and the sales sample in Panel B.
The first column lists the variables' names. The subsequent columns report the sample means (Mean) and standard
deviations (Std dev) respectively.

49

Table 8-2. Estimated Premiums, Corporates Investors Only (Large vs. Small)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
6.859 ***
5.51
7.846 ***
8.39
Constant
Constant
-0.007
-0.11
-0.011
-0.23
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
-0.337 ***
-5.34
-0.285 ***
-6.01
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.178 ***
-2.50
-0.334 ***
-5.12
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.228
0.71
-0.028
-0.12
Class A
Class A
-0.031
-0.29
0.138 *
1.84
Class B
Class B
-0.128
-1.23
-0.240 ***
-3.10
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.026
1.03
0.012
0.64
LnMarketCap
LnMarketCap
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [6 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [29 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [27 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [35 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [43 variables]
Adjusted R2:
32.52%
Adjusted R2:
35.57%
Observations:
312
Observations:
540
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and
property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 6 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 29 (27) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 35 (43) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed.
*** **
, , and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9-1. Summary Statistics, Corporates Investors Only (Public vs. Private)
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Public buyer

Public
(n = 306)
Mean
Std dev
91.75
104.79
654,263
1,710,757
133,080
275,376
29.80
19.48
0.04
0.19
0.43
0.50
0.53
0.50
0.30
0.46
1
0

Private: pre-match
(n = 3,609)
Mean
Std dev
66.05
61.27
253,362
642,929
58,025
110,823
32.09
19.49
0.02
0.15
0.41
0.49
0.57
0.50
0.39
0.49
0
0

Private: post-match
(n = 306)
Mean
Std dev
67.05
67.28
700,349
1,501,703
119,674
163,630
29.35
19.66
0.05
0.22
0.43
0.50
0.52
0.50
0.27
0.45
0
0

Panel B. Sales sample
Public
Private: pre-match
Private: post-match
(n = 539)
(n = 3,290)
(n = 539)
Variable
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
Price per square foot ($)
58.11
66.09
66.08
65.93
59.47
74.62
Land area (SF)
640,061
1,218,717 270,683
675,624
724,124
1,426,399
Building size (SF)
132,484
194,961
59,703
118,546
127,662
230,642
Property age (years)
35.19
18.63
35.47
21.12
35.63
19.22
Class A
0.03
0.18
0.02
0.14
0.03
0.16
Class B
0.47
0.50
0.38
0.49
0.47
0.50
Class C
0.50
0.50
0.60
0.49
0.51
0.50
Multi-tenant
0.31
0.46
0.40
0.49
0.33
0.47
Public seller
1
0
0
0
0
0
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the purchase sample in Panel A and the sales sample in
Panel B. The first column lists the variables' names. The subsequent columns report the sample means
(Mean) and standard deviations (Std dev) for the subsample of transactions by public corporate investors
and the subsample of transactions by privates before (pre-match) and after (post-match) the propensity
score matching, respectively.
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Table 9-2. Probit, Corporates Investors Only (Public vs. Private)
Panel A1. Probit for Public corporate buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-8.898
0.13
Constant
0.203 ***
21.03
ln(land area)
0.062
1.70
ln(building size)
-0.064
1.68
ln(property age)
*
-0.377
2.91
Class A
-0.101
1.66
Class B
-0.182 **
6.09
Multi-tenant
Second type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [66 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [107 variables]
pseudo-R2:
21.65%
Observations:
3,915

Panel B1. Probit for Public corporate seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-0.081
0.00
Constant
0.292 ***
68.46
ln(land area)
0.042
1.24
ln(building size)
0.160 ***
11.47
ln(property age)
0.031
0.03
Class A
0.082
1.69
Class B
-0.209 ***
11.93
Multi-tenant
Second type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [99 variables]
pseudo-R2:
18.44%
Observations:
3,829

Panel A2. Probit for Public corporate buyer (post-match)
Panel B2. Probit for Public corporate seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
6.127
0.00
5.944
0.00
Constant
Constant
-0.132 *
3.32
-0.089 *
2.94
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
0.098
1.73
0.071
1.77
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.028
0.13
0.005
0.01
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
-0.328
1.02
0.158
0.35
Class A
Class A
-0.013
0.01
0.020
0.05
Class B
Class B
0.081
0.43
-0.050
0.33
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Second type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [6 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [29 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [27 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [35 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [43 variables]
pseudo-R2:
5.37%
pseudo-R2:
4.35%
Observations:
612
Observations:
1,078
Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents the initial probit for
the buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation using the post-match samples
to confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is public corporate buyer (seller), which has a value of
one if the property is bought (sold) by a public corporate. The variables land area, building size, and property age are each
logged. The panels present the variables' names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the Wald Χ2
test statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes
9 (9) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 66 (48)
indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 107 (99) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one
suppressed. After matching, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 6 (9)
indicators to control for year of transaction, 29 (27) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 35 (43) indicators to
control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient based on the corresponding Wald statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

52

Table 9-3. Estimated Premiums, Corporates Investors Only (Public vs. Private)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
7.378 ***
8.45
9.234 ***
12.83
Constant
Constant
-0.019
-0.48
-0.014
-0.43
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
***
***
-0.309
-7.45
-0.319
-9.84
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.198 ***
-4.54
-0.307 ***
-7.10
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.306 *
1.70
0.081
0.50
Class A
Class A
0.033
0.46
0.138 ***
2.60
Class B
Class B
-0.133 *
-1.92
-0.158 ***
-2.98
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.248 ***
4.16
-0.021
-0.44
Public corporate buyer
Public corporate seller
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [6 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [29 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [27 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [35 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [43 variables]
Adjusted R2:
34.30%
Adjusted R2:
34.14%
Observations:
612
Observations:
1,078
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for
the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and
property age are each logged. The panels present the variables' names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 6 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 29 (27) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 35 (43) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 10-1. Summary Statistics, Corporates Investors Only (Nonlocals vs. Locals)
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable
Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Multi-tenant
Nonlocal buyer

Nonlocal
(n = 790)
Mean
Std dev
68.86
71.76
420,046
1,118,329
91,576
191,963
30.46
19.52
0.04
0.19
0.43
0.50
0.53
0.50
0.37
0.48
1
0

Local: pre-match
(n = 3,125)
Mean
Std dev
66.07
63.18
261,672
781,644
56,540
104,039
32.58
19.47
0.02
0.14
0.40
0.49
0.58
0.49
0.39
0.49
0
1

Local: post-match
(n = 790)
Mean
Std dev
60.41
59.96
435,409
1,212,831
86,020
148,380
31.00
19.23
0.04
0.19
0.44
0.50
0.52
0.50
0.37
0.48
0
0

Panel B. Sales sample
Nonlocal
Local: pre-match
Local: post-match
(n = 1,033)
(n = 2,796)
(n = 1,033)
Variable
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
Mean
Std dev
65.04
68.75
65.28
62.69
63.33
61.62
Price per square foot ($)
414,830
891,735
280,023
722,380
379,745
855,971
Land area (SF)
83,326
132,395
62,941
133,791
79,585
150,339
Building size (SF)
34.46
19.66
36.00
21.40
35.05
20.62
Property age (years)
0.02
0.15
0.02
0.14
0.03
0.16
Class A
0.43
0.49
0.37
0.48
0.41
0.49
Class B
0.55
0.50
0.61
0.49
0.56
0.50
Class C
0.37
0.48
0.41
0.49
0.38
0.49
Multi-tenant
Nonlocal seller
1
0
0
1
0
0
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the purchase sample in Panel A and the sales sample in
Panel B. The first column lists the variables’ names. The subsequent columns report the sample means
(Mean) and standard deviations (Std dev) for the subsample of transactions by nonlocal investors and the
subsample of transactions by locals before (pre-match) and after (post-match) the propensity score matching
respectively.
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Table 10-2. Probit, Corporates Investors Only (Nonlocals vs. Locals)
Panel A1. Probit for nonlocal buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-7.089
0.00
Constant
0.135 ***
15.22
ln(land area)
0.112 ***
8.73
ln(building size)
***
-0.143
13.95
ln(property age)
-0.052
0.09
Class A
-0.040
0.43
Class B
-0.121 **
4.75
Multi-tenant
Buyer type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [64 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [104 variables]
pseudo-R2:
15.21%
Observations:
3,915

Panel B1. Probit for nonlocal seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
2.131
0.00
Constant
0.260 ***
65.43
ln(land area)
-0.022
0.38
ln(building size)
0.003
0.00
ln(property age)
-0.097
0.28
Class A
0.119 **
4.31
Class B
-0.203 ***
14.35
Multi-tenant
Seller type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [94 variables]
pseudo-R2:
15.24%
Observations:
3,829

Panel A2. Probit for nonlocal buyer (post-match)
Panel B2. Probit for nonlocal seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
4.238
0.00
4.105
0.00
Constant
Constant
0.004
0.01
0.079 **
4.90
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
0.002
0.00
-0.017
0.20
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.050
1.18
-0.012
0.07
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
-0.069
0.12
-0.149
0.62
Class A
Class A
-0.060
0.65
0.044
0.49
Class B
Class B
0.046
0.42
-0.050
0.65
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
Second type indicators:
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Sale conditions:
Sale conditions:
Included [39 variables]
Included [38 variables]
Market indicators:
Market indicators:
Included [57 variables]
Included [63 variables]
pseudo-R2:
3.90%
pseudo-R2:
4.96%
Observations:
1,580
Observations:
2,066
Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents the initial probit for
the buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation using the post-match samples
to confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is nonlocal buyer (seller), which has a value of one if
the property is bought (sold) by a nonlocal. The variables land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels
present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the Wald Χ2 test statistics in the
third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicator
variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 64 (48) indicators to control
for unique sale conditions, and 104 (94) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. After
matching, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 9 (8) indicators to control for
year of transaction, 39 (38) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 57 (63) indicators to control for geographic
property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding Wald statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 10-3. Estimated Premiums, Corporates Investors Only (Nonlocals vs. Locals)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.843 ***
8.76
8.312 ***
17.03
Constant
Constant
-0.027
-1.12
-0.056 **
-2.72
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
***
***
-0.274
-10.68
-0.276
-12.65
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.156 ***
-6.34
-0.275 ***
-10.61
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
***
0.276
2.64
0.279 ***
2.54
Class A
Class A
0.156 ***
3.88
0.133 ***
3.64
Class B
Class B
-0.076 **
-1.99
-0.128 ***
-3.64
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.170 ***
4.85
0.043
1.30
Nonlocal corporate buyer
Nonlocal corporate seller
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [39 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [38 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [57 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [63 variables]
Adjusted R2:
32.75%
Adjusted R2:
35.41%
Observations:
1,580
Observations:
2,066
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for
the propensity-score matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size, and
property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 9 (8) indicators to control for year of transaction, 39 (38) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 57 (63) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one
suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 11. Estimated Premiums, Corporates Investors Only (Industrial Differences)
Panel A. Buyers sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity score matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t stat)
7.038 ***
6.50
8.027 ***
8.81
Constant
Constant
0.018
0.27
-0.042
-0.88
ln(land area)
ln(land area)
-0.337 ***
-5.12
-0.253 ***
-5.22
ln(building size)
ln(building size)
-0.148 **
-2.08
-0.351 ***
-5.28
ln(property age)
ln(property age)
0.179
0.56
0.155
0.66
Class A
Class A
-0.142
-1.31
0.147 **
1.99
Class B
Class B
-0.128
-1.23
-0.232 ***
-2.99
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
DSector2
0.174
0.89
DSector2
0.154
1.10
DSector3
0.416 *
1.73
DSector3
-0.003
-0.02
DSector4
0.239
1.02
DSector4
0.136
0.91
DSector5
0.343 *
1.89
DSector5
0.059
0.40
DSector6
0.594 *
1.71
DSector6
0.328
1.20
DSector7
0.620
1.52
DSector7
0.201
0.66
DSector8
0.906 ***
3.57
DSector8
0.243
1.37
DSector9
1.040 *
1.90
DSector9
-0.262
-1.10
DSector10
0.587 ***
2.68
DSector10
0.527 ***
2.68
***
DSector11
0.758
3.21
DSector11
0.384 ***
2.33
DSector12
0.658 ***
2.89
DSector12
0.581 ***
2.40
Second type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Second type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [6 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [29 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [29 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [35 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [43 variables]
Adjusted R2:
36.37%
Adjusted R2:
39.53%
Observations:
307
Observations:
536
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for
the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size,
and property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the
estimated coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to
Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicators to
control for secondary property types, 6 (9) indicators to control for year of transaction, 29 (29) indicators
to control for unique sale conditions, and 35 (43) indicators to control for geographic property markets,
with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
According to Nasdaq (http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx), the business
sectors are divided into: Basic industry (DSector1), Capital (DSector2), Consumer Durables (DSector3),
Consumer Non-Durables (DSector4), Consumer Service (DSector5), Energy (DSector6), Finance
(DSector7), Health Care (DSector8), Miscellaneous (DSector9), Public Utilities (DSector10), Technology
(DSector11), and Transportation (DSector12).
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Appendix 1: Table 12. Estimated Premiums, Corporate vs. Non-institutional (Robustness Check)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.962 ***
10.45
6.990 ***
14.98
Constant
Constant
-0.023 ***
-3.73
-0.010 ***
-3.75
ln(Land area)
ln(Land area)
-0.259 ***
-16.66
-0.258 ***
-16.05
ln(Building size)
ln(Building size)
-0.269 ***
-17.51
-0.280 ***
-16.42
ln(Property age)
ln(Property age)
***
0.150
3.75
0.234 ***
2.30
Class A
Class A
0.082 ***
3.34
0.071 ***
2.78
Class B
Class B
***
***
-0.014
-2.66
-0.009
-2.39
Multi-tenant
Multi-tenant
0.090 ***
2.65
0.058
0.24
Corporate buyer
Corporate seller
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Secondary type indicators: Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [66 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [48 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [107 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [99 variables]
Adjusted R2:
32.18%
Adjusted R2:
31.22%
Observations:
7,830
Observations:
7,658
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables Price per square foot, Land area, Building size and
Property age are each logged. The Panels present the variable name in the first column, the estimated
coefficient in the second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. The t-statistic and reported
significance level are based on standard errors clustered by market and calendar year. All variables are defined
in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation also includes
indicators to control for secondary property types, transaction years, sale conditions and markets, with one
suppressed. *** and ** indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding tstatistic at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 2: NAIOP Terms and Definitions
Industrial Building: A facility in which the space is used primarily for research, development, service, production,
storage or distribution of goods and which may also include some office space. Industrial buildings are further divided
into three primary classifications: manufacturing, warehouse and flex buildings. Typical characteristics of the different
types of Industrial Buildings are shown in the matrix. Buildings must exhibit more than one of the characteristics but need
not exhibit all characteristics to be considered under a specific classification.
Manufacturing Building: A facility used for the conversion, fabrication and/or assembly of raw or partly wrought
materials into products/goods.
Warehouse: A facility primarily used for the storage and/or distribution of materials, goods, and merchandise.
Distribution Building: A type of warehouse facility designed to accommodate efficient movement of goods.
Truck Terminal: A specialized distribution building for redistributing goods from one truck to another as an intermediate
transfer point. These facilities are primarily used for staging loads (rather than long-term storage) and possess very little if
any storage area.
Flex Facility: As its name suggests, an industrial building designed to allow its occupants flexibility of alternative uses of
the space, usually in an industrial park setting. Specialized flex buildings include service center/showroom properties.
Service Center/Showroom: A type of flex facility characterized by a substantial showroom area, usually fronting a
freeway or major road.
Building Type
Manufacturing
Primary Type
Primary Use

General
Purpose
Manufacturing

Sub-Sets

Heavy,
Light Manufacturing

Size (SF)
Clear Height (ft)
Loading Docks/Doors
Door-to-Square-Foot Ratio
Office Percentage
Vehicle Parking Ratio
Truck Turning Radius (ft)

Any
10+
Yes
Varies
<20%
Varies
130

Warehouse

Flex

Warehouse
General Purpose
Warehouse
Storage,
Distribution

Distribution
General Purpose
Truck
Distribution
Terminal
Distribution
Truck
Trans-shipment

Bulk Warehouse,
Cold/Refrigerator Storage,
Freezer Storage,
High-Cube
Any
16+
Yes
1:5k-15k
<15%
Low
130

Overnight Delivery
Services, Air
Cargo

Heavy, Light
Manufacturing

Any
16+
Yes
1:3k-10k
<20%
Low
120-130

Any
12-16
Cross-dock
1:500-5k
<10%
Varies
130

General Purpose
Flex
R&D, Storage,
Office, Lab,
Light Mfg,
High Tech Uses,
Data/Call Center

Service Center/
Showroom
Retail
Showroom,
Storage

Any
10-24
Yes
1:15k+
30-100%
High
110

Any
Any
Yes
1:10k
30+%
High
110

Source: NAIOP Research foundation (www.naiop.org).
Notes: This matrix is intended to be an aid in classifying properties between the principal industrial building types, subject to the
following considerations:
1. These are intended to be TYPICAL characteristics of different properties, but actual characteristics may vary.
2. In classifying properties, the user should select the classification that most closely fits a given property.
3. The most important characteristics of each type are highlighted. While these characteristics are not "acid tests," they should
guide the user in most instances.
4. Divisibility varies depending on building size and configuration.
5. Truck turning radius is an important consideration and varies by building size. Large pure distribution facilities have a
turning radius of 130 feet; medium to large facilities are 120 feet and smaller facilities are typically 110 feet.
6. Truck Turning Radius: The tightest turn a truck can make depending on several variables of truck configuration, trailer size
and location of adjacent objects that obstruct the inner turn radius.
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Essay II

Government Investors in Industrial Real Estate Markets
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Essay II: Government Investors in Industrial Real Estate Markets
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction

Governments play an important role in society. As a result, their actions have a significant impact on the
markets under their domain. Government roles and impacts have been widely studied in the real estate
literature. While most studies focus on externalities and the consequences of government policies and
actions, the involvement of governments as direct investors in the real estate market is an issue rarely
examined. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies examine governments as direct investors in the
real estate market: Allen, Rutherford, and Warner (1997) and Ooi, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2011). Because
of the lack of research in this area, how governments engage in real estate property transactions remains
unclear. To fill the gap in the literature, this research focuses on governments and their agencies,
primarily at the city or township levels, that purchase and sell industrial real estate in U.S. markets. I
check for any observable market outcome difference when they transact industrial assets. Further, if such
a difference does exist, what might be the reasons that contribute to it? This study extends our knowledge
on government real asset transactions and, for the first time, focuses on governments as a direct investor
group in industrial real estate.

There are a number of reasons for why governments might perform differently when transacting in the
industrial market. Governments may behave differently than other investors due to agency problems,
special regulations on property acquisition and disposal, restricted supply at desired locations, high
holding costs for government-owned properties, or special circumstances, such as tax delinquency
transactions or community redevelopment programs. In this study, each of these possibilities is carefully
scrutinized or controlled for whenever feasible.

Government asset management for real estate is a non-trivial issue. According to the U.S. Census Bureau
Reports as part of the 2012 Census of Governments, “in 2012, 89,004 local governments existed in the
United States. Local governments included 3,031 counties, 19,522 municipalities, 16,364 townships,
37,203 special districts and 12,884 independent school districts.” Local governments in California alone
as an example, own more than 35,000 properties. The fact that the economic scale and potential impacts
are so large has drawn much public attention in the past. Governments have long been criticized by many
parties for their low operational efficiency and potential agency problems when spending taxpayer
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money24. Further, many previous studies have shown that the characteristics of governments that led to
such criticism have resulted in financial or economic loss to the public. Several scholars, politicians, and
citizens even point out severe government waste on real estate25.

To disentangle the puzzle on governmental real asset transactions, I extend the work of Allen, Rutherford,
and Warner (1997) and Ooi, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2011) on the rental and land markets to the property
transactions market. I consider the factors that could potentially explain the market outcome differences
for governments. To test the hypotheses, I follow the methodology used in the studies that examine
clientele effects in real estate markets and apply the appropriate techniques to control for selection bias26.
In the analysis, a large dataset of industrial property transactions from the CoStar is used to evaluate the
market outcomes of government transactions throughout the major U.S. markets. In doing so, I contribute
to understanding government performance by combining the analysis of both purchase and divestiture
transactions.

The research questions are evaluated with a large sample of industrial property transactions in 135 major
U.S. metropolitan markets. The analysis reveals that, in general, local governments buy high and sell low
relative to the prices of similar properties transacted by individuals27. On average, governments overpay
by an estimated 9.8% and sell at a discount of 17.3%. To evaluate the potential explanations, I first test
whether the market outcome differences are due to any special economic motivations or considerations by
controlling the potential selection bias and special sales conditions. The results are consistent after
potential selection bias and special sales conditions are controlled, ruling out the possibility that the
market outcome differences are due to any special economic motivations or considerations. Then, I test
whether the unfavorable result for property sales is due to the higher holding cost involved in maximizing
the net selling proceeds. The indifference to selling time, shown by a regression on market duration, rules
out the possibility that the differences are due to higher holding costs. I also examine whether the market
outcome differences are due to brokerage involvement. The results on the impact of brokerage
involvement show that using a buyer broker when purchase and using a listing broker when sell have no
significant impact on the market outcome differences. Therefore, the results on market outcome

24

For example, see Friedman, M. (2004). Fox News interview.
For example, reference can be found in Mica, J., Petri, T., Duncan, J., LoBiondo, F., Shuster, B., Boozman, J., & Diaz-Balart,
M. (2010). Sitting on My assets: The federal government’s misuse of taxpayer-owned assets. U.S. House of Representatives
report and analysis. Allen, M. T., Rutherford, R. C., & Warner, L. J. (1997). A comparison of federal government office rents with
market rents. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 15(2), 181-192.
26
Clientele effect and methodological foundational studies include Dale-Johnson (1983), Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans
(2003), Wood and Tu (2004), Lambson, McQueen and Slade (2004), Benjamin, Chinloy, Hardin and Wu (2008), Wiley (2012),
Chernobai and Chernobai (2013), and Zhou, Gibler, and Zahirovic-Herbert (2014).
27
As defined in CoStar, individuals used in this study are organized as sole proprietary or partnership business.
25
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differences generally suggest the existence of an agency problem and government waste in real asset
transactions with direct government participation. In addition, I also examined whether the government
budget can affect the degree of government waste. I find that governments with higher budgets do not pay
or sell significantly different than their counterparts. However, governments with reduced budgets from
previous year tend to sell their real assets at a lower price28. In addition, I test the impact of political
parties on the transaction price but I did not find a significant difference.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of related
studies. Section 3 introduces the theoretical background and the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data
and empirical methods for the hypothesis testing. Section 5 interprets the empirical results. Section 6
provides the concluding remarks.

2. The Literature on Government Activities in the Real Estate Market
Although government impacts have been widely studied, governments’ role as participants in the real
estate market has received less attention. Among the studies that consider the government’s role in real
estate markets, several focus on government spending, programs, and policies. Church (1981) examines
the effects of local government expenditure and property taxes on investment and finds that municipal
expenditure increases investment while property tax diminishes it. Burge (2011) evaluates the lowincome housing tax credit program and finds that the program generates inefficient benefits for lowincome households but significant benefits for project developers and owners. Zheng and Kahn (2013)
conclude that public investments by metropolitan governments have caused local gentrification.

Several studies also focus on the impact of tax increment financing (TIF) districts and other development
districts. Smith (2009) finds that commercial properties located within TIF districts exhibit higher rates of
appreciation once the area is designated as a qualifying TIF district. Merriman, Skidmore, and Kashian
(2011) study the effect of TIF and find that it has led to significant increases in aggregate property values
in commercial TIF districts. Noonan and Krupka (2011) examine historic preservation policies and find
negative impacts for properties both within and outside the districts after historic designation. However,
Zahirovic-Herbert and Gibler (2014) study the impact of historic district designation in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, and find that historic preservation increases property value within the district and reduces
nearby marketing duration. In addition, Billings and Thibodeau (2013) examine the financing of
28

Budget can change due to various reasons, in this study, I focus on the relationship of change on budget and the price the
governments willing to pay or receive.
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residential development and find that house prices within development districts are lower than house
prices outside such districts.

Lacking from this literature is the investigation of governments as direct investors in real estate markets.
To date, studies that come closest to considering governments as participants concern the rental market—
Allen, Rutherford, and Warner (1997), for example. This work focuses on government performance in the
office rental market and reveals that rents paid by governments during the 1980s were significantly higher
than average market rents. Ooi, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2011) examine land sales by governments and
find that such sales are modestly different in timing compared with those of private parties. Peng and
Thibodeau (2012) consider government interference and find that the market for residential land becomes
less efficient after governments gain direct control of land supply. To fill the gap in the literature, the
present essay examines governments as a direct real estate investor group.

I follow the methodology used in studies of clientele effects and selection bias to consider government
performance and evaluate the research questions. Previous research has demonstrated the presence of
numerous persistent clientele effects in real estate markets. For example, in commercial real estate
markets, Lambson, McQueen and Slade (2004) examine the out-of-state investor performance in the
apartment market and suggest that locality influences the transaction price through the anchoring effect
and information asymmetry. Benjamin, Chinloy, Hardin, and Wu (2008) conclude that, in apartment
transactions, the price depends on clienteles in addition to characteristics. They find that condo converters
outbid rental investors due to a change in systematic risk, which raises their expected returns. Wiley
(2012) tests the transaction price difference in the office market between corporate and non-institutional
investors and finds that corporate investors pay a significantly higher price when they buy and then sell at
a significant discount. The difference between corporate investors and non-institutionals is attributed to
the differences in valuation, cyclical investment, and marketing behavior. Further, Liu, Gallimore, and
Wiley (2013) find that nonlocal investors pay a significant premium when purchasing and sell at a
significant discount when divesting in the commercial office market. Such investors also experience
information asymmetry and the anchoring effect.

In addition, the models employed to measure transaction prices are drawn from previous studies that
focus on industrial assets. For example, Ambrose (1990) finds that asking price is a function of property
characteristics such as building size. Fehribach, Rutherford, and Eakin (1993) add age, and tenant type as
components to the model and find improvement in the model fit. Lockwood and Rutherford (1996) find
that the most important price determinant of industrial property is parcel size. Black, Wolverton, Warden,
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and Pittman (1997) find, examining the southeastern U.S. region, that distance to a metropolitan area, and
building condition contribute to the value of industrial assets. I adopt the models and variables from these
studies whenever available and appropriate. More detailed discussion on the data and empirical methods
used in this study are provided in the Data and Empirical Methods section.

3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Governments as direct investors in real estate markets may behave differently for several reasons. First,
governments have been criticized regarding agency issues with the spending of taxpayer money. For
example, Friedman (2004) points out a major agency problem associated with governments when he says:
“There are four ways in which you can spend money. You can spend your own money on yourself …
Then you can spend your own money on somebody else … Then, I can spend somebody else’s money on
myself … Finally, I can spend somebody else’s money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else’s
money on somebody else, I’m not concerned about how much it is, and I’m not concerned about what I
get. And that’s government. And that’s close to 40% of our national income.” From this, we can see that
when using other people’s money, it is questionable whether governments have any incentive to obtain
the best price when making a transaction in real estate markets.

Second, the fact that governments may behave differently than other investors is evidenced from
regulations on the procedural requirements for government property acquisitions and divestitures. In
contrast to ordinary investors, governments have a specific process in place for dealing with changes in
their real asset holdings. For example, on the federal level29, according to the Real Property Acquisition
Handbook issued by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), when governments make
purchases, they first have to determine which real estate assets they need to acquire, and the locations,
according to their plans. After identifying their target real estate assets and notifying the owners, they
have to engage in an appraisal process with their own appraisers in order to discover the estimated fair
market values of the properties. After the appraisals, the governments then make offers to the property
owners or negotiate with the owners about the prices. If the owners accept the offers, then the
governments obtain the properties after making payments. If there is a dispute, a government will start the
condemnation process. During this, the property owner can work with his or her own attorney and
appraiser to reevaluate the property and provide a new offer to the government. If the government accepts
the offer, the deal is closed; if not, the issue enters a litigation process to achieve a final settlement. When
29

Local governments may follow different rules when dealing with their real estate properties based on their own regulation and
legislation. An example of real estate regulation at the city level is shown in Appendix 2. A common feature of government
divestitures is that the procedure is either complicated or time-consuming.
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a government agency determines that it has a property that it does not need any more, the property is first
offered to other agencies to enable them to screen it for potential use. If the other agencies cannot find a
potential use, the property is considered for other public uses. If the property is truly redundant, then its
value is appraised, after which it can be offered for public sale, through either a sealed bid or a public
auction. The highest bidder becomes the owner.

With such a complicated and lengthy process, several reasons could cause governments to underperform
when they engage in transactions. First, governments usually miss the best opportunities to buy or sell
their properties because the process may take years to complete, whereas markets are constantly changing
and private entities (which lack the procedural requirements) are more agile to take advantage of shifts in
market conditions. Second, the lengthy process is costly, and it is difficult to reverse the process once it
begins. For example, a government agency is usually required to pay a fee in order to deal with any
property-related issues, such as environmental problems, repairs, and maintenance, before it can place a
property on the market. Moreover, a non-recourse fee must be paid during the screening process when the
government agency is looking for a use of the property by other agencies or for public benefit 30. Thus,
once the process begins, it is rarely cancelled. Third, engaging in litigation during the acquisition process
is both time-consuming and costly. The best way to avoid litigation is to submit a competitive offer at the
earliest practical point.

To test whether the agency role of governments combined with special regulations cause differences in
market outcomes of government real estate transactions, two hypotheses are provided below:

H1a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments buy at similar prices as
compared to individuals.
H1b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments sell at similar prices as
compared to individuals.

Government performance may also be explained by market factors such as supply constraints and higher
holding costs for centrally-located assets. For example, a government might prefer to acquire a property
that is located close to the center of its citizens for convenience rather than along the urban periphery.
Consequently, there is a scarcity of centrally-located sites and competition from other investors is
heightened, which means that the acquisition price that the government pays may be higher as a result of

30

According to Mica, Petri, Duncan, LoBiondo, Shuster, Boozman, and Diaz-Balart (2010)
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locational factors. However, due to the nature of data used in this study, only submarkets can be
controlled whereas proximity to a central urban point cannot.

As pointed out by Mica, Petri, Duncan, LoBiondo, Shuster, Boozman, and Diaz-Balart (2010),
government-owned properties usually have a higher holding costs because of regulations that require
governments to maintain a higher maintenance standard during ownership. Therefore, the higher holding
cost of government-owned property may cause the government to divest the property more quickly, and at
a lower price. If so, selling government-owned property at a lower price could be a rational decision to
limit excessive holding costs. To test whether the differences in the market outcomes of government
transactions are due to considerations of maximizing the net selling proceeds because of higher holding
costs, I propose the following hypothesis:

H2: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, the market duration is not significantly
different in divestitures made by governments and individuals.

All the aforementioned reasons suggest that governments may buy high and sell low when they enter into
transactions and that governments may sell properties more quickly than other investors may. In addition,
several other reasons exist for why governments may buy or sell industrial properties at a different price
including tax delinquency or considerations of boosting the local economy. In this dissertation, different
sale conditions are controlled for to test the difference in outcomes for government acquisitions and
divestitures.

The fact that the agency role of governments in the use of taxpayers’ money may lead to government
waste in industrial real estate leads to the next question: Does the adequacy of funds matter? In other
words, does the adequacy of or a change in the government budget affect the degree of overpayment or
discount when governments buy or sell real assets? To test the impact of the government budget on the
market outcomes of government transactions, four hypotheses are proposed:

H3a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments with higher budgets buy at
similar prices as compared to those with lower budgets31.
31

Budget amount relative to population or budget per capita might be another import consideration when governments make a
decision. However, when governments make a decision to purchase real property, this might already be counted into the
characteristics of the property they are going to acquire. For example, if the budget per capita is high for a government, then
government might be willing to buy a larger or better real property to provide a larger or better space per capita, but the overall
budget already set the limitation on how much the government can afford. For aforementioned reason, when purchasing real
estate, the overall budget might be more relevant than per capita budget.
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H3b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments with higher budgets sell at
similar prices as compared to those with lower budgets.
H4a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments with increased budgets buy at
similar prices as compared to governments with reduced budgets.
H4b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments with increased budgets sell at
similar prices as compared to governments with reduced budgets.

Although price differences among investor groups for both payments and receipts may be due to several
internal factors related to unique investor characteristics and backgrounds, external forces may mitigate or
exacerbate these effects. Therefore, the question that arises is as follows: Could using real estate brokers
mitigate these differences for their principals when governments buy high and sell low? To test whether
using brokers could mitigate the market outcome differences, two hypotheses are proposed:

H5a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments buy at similar prices as
compared to individuals regardless of whether or not brokers are used.
H5b: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments sell at similar prices as
compared to individuals regardless of whether or not brokers are used.

Lastly, the impacts from political parties are considered in this study. Based on historical presidential
election statistics for the period 1992 to 2012, which matches our transaction sample period, the impacts
from political parties are examined. The states are divided into Republican and Democratic32 based on the
dominant political party in the state according to the statistics in Appendix 3. The transactions are then
examined to detect the difference between Republican and Democratic governments. The hypotheses
tested on this issue are as follows:

32

The sample was divided into Democratic or Republican state based on the total number of presidential election votes in favor
of Democratic or Republican candidate in each state during the time of 1992 to 2012. And, if the majority of vote support
Democratic candidate during the time of 1992 to 2012, then I categorize that state as Democratic (Blue) state, vice versa, as
Republican (Red) state. The terms used to colorize the states are first introduced by Tim Russert in the year of 2000 and are
popularized later on. The definition can also be seen from Levendusky and Pope (2011), “Red states are those carried by
Republicans at the presidential level; Blue states are those carried by Democrats”. I need to admit there is a limitation of this
study, because the local politician’s information is not easily to acquire, thus the results might not best reflect the political
impacts at local level. However, analyses on political impacts and difference between Democratic and Republican states are well
documented and their research design dominates in the literature, although still lacking of consensus. For example, Barry (2004)
suggests Americans are deeply divided and differences are prominent. While, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2005) argue that
people live in red or blue states are quite similar. However, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) and Bafumi and Shapiro (2009)
suggest differences between red and blue states are sizable. Later, Levendusky and Pope (2011) point out that even though the
average opinion in red states is significantly more conservative and red and blue states are polarized, but red- and blue-state
citizens often hold very similar issue positions. For aforementioned reasons, by following their research design, I examine the
difference on government transactions in industrial real estate markets between red and blue states.
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H6a: Given transactions in similar industrial assets, governments in Republican states buy at
similar prices as compared to governments in Democratic states.
H6b: Given transactions in the similar industrial assets, governments in Republican states sell at
similar prices as compared to governments in Democratic states.

4. Data and Empirical Methods

4.1 Data
Data used in this study are from the CoStar COMPS® database. CoStar is one of the leading information
providers for commercial real estate transactions. The database provides detailed and verified information
for commercial property transactions in 138 major metropolitan markets33 throughout the U.S. For each
property, the information includes price per square foot, land area, building size, building class, building
address, transaction date, and sale conditions as well as details of the buyer’s and seller’s companies, their
addresses, the broker on the buyer’s and seller’s sides, and investor type classification34.

Data for the empirical tests are collected from the CoStar website under the category of either
governments or individuals and for the purchase and divestiture sides. I draw the sample of government
and individual transactions with a time range from 1991 through 2012. During the data collection process,
I first select one type of investor on the purchase side. I then adjust the property size from one square foot
and gradually increase it to infinity to obtain all the transaction records that satisfy my search criteria.

33

A total of 138 markets are identified on CoStar. The markets are Albany/Schenectady/Troy, Albuquerque, Anchorage,
Asheville, Atlanta, Augusta/Richmond County, Austin, Bakersfield, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, Beaumont/Port Arthur,
Birmingham; Boise City/Nampa, Boston, Bremerton/Silverdale, Brownsville/Harlingen, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, Charleston WV,
Charleston/N Charleston, Charlotte, Chattanooga, Chicago, Cincinnati/Dayton, Cleveland, Colorado Springs, Columbia,
Columbus, Columbus GA, Corpus Christi, Dallas/Ft Worth, Davenport/Moline/Rock Island, Deltona/Daytona Beach, Denver,
Des Moines, Detroit, Duluth, East Bay/Oakland, El Paso, Erie; Evansville, Fayetteville, Fayetteville/Springdale/Rogers, Fort
Smith, Fort Wayne, Fresno, Green Bay, Greensboro/Winston-Salem, Greenville/Spartanburg, Hampton Roads, Hartford, Hawaii,
Houston, Huntington/Ashland, Huntsville, Indianapolis, Inland Empire (California), Jackson, Jacksonville (Florida), Kansas City,
Killeen/Temple/Fort Hood, Kingsport/Bristol/Bristol, Knoxville, Lafayette, Las Vegas, Lexington/Fayette, Lincoln, Little
Rock/N Little Rock, Long Island (New York), Los Angeles, Louisville, Lubbock, Marin/Sonoma, McAllen/Edinburg/Pharr,
Memphis, Milwaukee/Madison, Minneapolis/St Paul, Mobile, Montgomery, Myrtle Beach/Conway, Nashville, New
Orleans/Metairie/Kenner, New York City, Northern New Jersey, Ocala, Oklahoma City, Olympia, Omaha/Council Bluffs,
Orange County (California), Orlando, Pensacola, Peoria, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Port St Lucie/Fort Pierce, Portland,
Portland/South Portland, Providence, Raleigh/Durham, Reno/Sparks, Richmond VA, Roanoke, Rochester, Sacramento, Salinas,
Salt Lake City, San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, San Luis Obispo/Paso Robles, Santa Barbara/Sta Maria/Goleta, Santa
Cruz/Watsonville, Savannah, Seattle/Puget Sound, Shreveport/Bossier City, South Bay/San Jose, South Bend/Mishawaka, South
Florida, Southwest Florida, Spokane, Springfield, St. Louis, Stockton/Modesto, Syracuse, Tallahassee, Tampa/St Petersburg,
Toledo, Tucson, Tulsa, Utica/Rome, Visalia/Porterville, Washington, DC, West Michigan, Westchester/So Connecticut, Wichita,
Wilmington, Yakima, and Youngstown/Warren/Boardman.
34
Investor types listed in CoStar are bank/finance, corporate, national developer, regional developer, educational, endowment,
equity funds, government, individual, insurance, investment manager, listed fund, medical, nonprofit, other private, other
unknown institution, pension fund, private REIT, REIT, religious, REOC, sovereign, special, tenants, and trust.
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Because CoStar allows no more than 500 observations to be downloaded each time, several batches35 of
data under one investor type are collected and then combined to compose the full sample for the investor
type. This procedure is repeated for each investor type to obtain all necessary data. The combined
purchase sample includes 11,104 observations, and the combined sales sample includes 12,229
observations. Governments represent 3% of the purchase sample and 4% of the sales sample36.

The data used to test the impact of the government budget on market outcomes are collected from each
local government’s website. To collect the data, I first go to the website of the local government. Then, I
search the budget reports on the website. The documents are provided usually under the finance
department of the local government and categorized as financial documents. I download the documents
for the year in which the transaction happened and one year prior to the transaction year. After that, I read
each of the reports to find the approved budget for the transaction year and prior year, and then record and
match them with the Costar data37.

Summary statistics for the full sample of government and individual transactions are shown in Table 1.
Panels A and B of Table 1 provide the results of the purchase and sales samples, respectively. For
example, the average industrial structure in the purchase sample is around 25,275 square feet, situated on
a 2.7-acre lot. The structure itself is over 36 years old. Just 1% of the sample is Class A, while 31% is
Class B and 68%-69% is Class C. The average transaction price is around US$72 per square foot. A
similar pattern can be found in the sales sample.

4.2 Methodology

The summary statistics show that the average property selected by governments is substantially different
from the average asset selected by individuals. In order to control for selection bias and compare similar
assets across the government and individual subsamples, the propensity score matching procedure is
35

For example, 7 batches of data under the category of governments on the buyer side have been collected, and 57 batches of
data under the category of individuals on the buyer side have been collected.
36
Most transactions are made by governments at the city and township levels, while only a few transactions are by state or
federal governments. For example, the original data contain 24 transactions by state governments and 3 transactions by the
federal government.
37
I need to admit that I cannot expect an immediate change in government behavior (price accepted) when budget goes up or
down, but by taking a consideration from two years (transaction year and the year before transaction year), it allow governments
to have 730 days to adjust their decision, which is more than the sample average of 480 days of time on market. And the most
probable time the government is willing to make a change on price is the time close to the transaction happens. I also have to
admit I do not think there is a perfect linear relationship between premium been paid by government and the percent change of
the budget from year to year, but that might be the best assumption on the relationship so far when the exactly relationship is
unknown, and it makes common sense. An alternative method is to include squared budget change as an independent variable to
correct the relationship, but the squared budget change does not make significant difference on the coefficient estimation.
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applied. I match the most similar transactions made by government buyers/sellers with individual
buyers/sellers based on the calculated propensity score. The probit estimation for generating the
propensity scores is shown in Equation (1).

(1)

Pr{Government = 1} = Φ{β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM}.

Government is the binary dependent variable used on the left-hand side of the equation, where a value of
one indicates government investors and zero identifies individual investors. Probit estimations are
performed separately for the purchase and sales samples. Property characteristics (X) and other indicator
variables, including secondary property type (T), calendar year of the transaction date (Y), unique set of
sale conditions (C), and metropolitan market (M), are controlled. I include a set of variables for property
characteristics (X), such as land area, building size, property age, and property class. In addition, I use 10
distinct secondary property types (T) 38 to control for subtype heterogeneity and 21 calendar year
indicators (Y) for 1991 through 2012 to control for the timing impact. Moreover, 36 unique sale condition
(C) indicators are used to represent each of the possible combinations that appear in the samples, and 138
metropolitan markets (M) are represented in the two samples to control for geographic differences.

Equation (2) is used repeatedly to identify whether government buyers/sellers pay or sell at a different
price in the market for industrial buildings, compared to individuals. When running Equation (2), the
propensity score matched samples are used in the estimation. I expect the coefficient for government to be
positive for purchases and negative for sales.

(2)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βG·I{Government
investor} + ε.

The dependent variable price per square foot, logged, is used on the left-hand side of the equation. The
independent variables used in Equation (2) are similar to those specified in Equation (1) and include a set
of independent variables used to control for property characteristics (X), secondary property type (T),
calendar year (Y), sale conditions (C), and geographic market (M). The estimation based on Equation (2)
is performed individually for the purchase and sales samples. I {Government investor} indicates whether
the transactions are made by government investors (valued one) or individuals (valued zero). The

38

Secondary property types include distribution, food processing, manufacturing, refrigeration/cold storage, service, showroom,
telecom hotel/data hosting, truck terminal, and warehouse.
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coefficient of βG estimates the percentage difference in transaction prices of government investors versus
individuals.

In addition to transaction prices, marketing duration can also affect the industrial market equilibrium. It
can be seen as an indicator of an investor’s skill and patience. In this study, it also shows whether the
market outcome differences are due to the higher holding cost incurred to maximize net selling proceeds.
Marketing duration can be observed in the sales sample only. Equation (3) provides the model to test the
differences among investor groups.

(3)

ln(Marketing duration) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βP· ln (Price per square
foot) + βG·I{Government investor} + ε.

In Equation (3), the estimated coefficient for βG shows the percentage difference in marketing duration for
properties sold by government investors relative to similar assets sold by individuals.

To test the impact of the government budget on market outcomes of government transactions, Equation (4)
and Equation (5) are used as shown below.

(4)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βBLnBudget + ε.

The independent variables used in Equation (4) are similar to those specified in Equation (1) plus the
continuous variable of government budget (B), logged. The estimated coefficient for βB in Equation (4)
identifies the percentage difference in price per square foot for properties based on the total amount of the
government budget in log form.

Similarly, to investigate the impact of budget changes on market outcomes, Equation (6) is applied.

(5)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βBCBudgetChange + ε.

The independent variables used in Equation (5) are similar to those specified in Equation (1) plus the
indicator variable of change in government budget (BC). The estimated coefficient for βBC in Equation (5)
identifies the percentage difference in price per square foot for properties bought or sold by government
investors with an increased budget relative to similar assets bought or sold by government investors with
a reduced budget.
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Brokerage intermediation effects are examined by using Equation (6). In the CoStar database, I am able to
differentiate among buying brokers and listing brokers. The buyer and seller of commercial real estate can
have a dedicated buying broker and listing broker who represent the buyer’s and seller’s interests,
respectively. This provides an opportunity to examine the brokerage intermediation effects on the
purchase and selling sides of the transaction.

(6)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βGB·I{Government
investor}·I{broker} + βG·I{Government investor} + βBB·I{Buyer broker} + βSB· I{Same
broker39}+ βLB·I{Listing broker} + ε.

Equation (6) extends Equation (2) by adding a dummy for broker usage. The estimated coefficient for βGB
in Equation (6) identifies the percentage difference in price per square foot for properties bought or sold
by government investors using buying brokers, or listing brokers relative to similar assets bought or sold
by individuals.

In addition, the impacts of political parties are examined using Equation (7).

(7)

ln(Price per square foot) = β0 + βXX + βTT + βYY + βCC + βMM + βG·I{Government
investor} + βR·I{Republican state} + βRG· I{Republican*Government} + ε.

Equation (7) extends Equation (2) by adding a dummy for the impact from political parties and an
interactive term of government investor with political parties. The estimated coefficient for βRG in
Equation (7) identifies the percentage difference in price per square foot for properties bought or sold by
Republican state governments relative to similar assets bought or sold by Democratic states governments.

5. Empirical Results

Table 2 presents the results of the propensity score matching procedure. Panels A1 and A2 of Table 2
report the estimations for the purchase sample, while Panels B1 and B2 report the estimation results for
the sales sample. Prior to the matching, land area and property age, along with other control variables,
significantly affect government asset selection. The results in Panel A1 reveal that government buyers

39

Same broker is dual agent.
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prefer older industrial assets on large lots. Panel B1 shows that government sellers tend to divest
somewhat larger properties and those with larger land area (relative to the average non-government asset
sale). After matching, the purchase sample includes 670 observations, and the sales sample includes 958
observations, which are evenly drawn from the government and individual investor samples. Table 1 also
provides the summary statistics for the propensity score matched sample of individual investors. Selection
bias has been corrected since all coefficients are insignificant and the pseudo-R2 values have dropped
drastically.

Table 3 presents the central empirical results of this study. Panel A of Table 3 shows the estimation for
the purchase sample and Panel B for the sales sample. Governments overpay by an estimated 9.8% and
sell at a discount of 17.3% relative to the prices for similar assets transacted by individual buyers or
sellers. The estimated coefficients are significant, and the signs of the coefficients match the expectations.
Converting the percentage differences to real numbers, I can see that the government pays, on average, a
premium of $6.56 per square foot and sells at discount of $12.45 per square foot, considering that the
average transaction price is $66.96 per square foot in the purchase sample and $72.03 per square foot in
the sales sample (see Table 1).

The differential is nontrivial when converted into aggregate waste. The degree of overpayment is
approximately $371,316 per asset purchased. The amount of money left on the table upon exit averages
$541,749 per asset sold. With nearly 90,000 state and local governments in the U.S., the cumulative effect
of the systematic waste and inefficiency from poor investment decisions should be deserving of more
attention.

Table 4 provides the analysis result of the test for market duration differences in divestiture. The
insignificant result suggests that the discount in divestiture is not due to the higher holding costs involved
in maximizing overall sales proceeds.

Criticism of government fiscal policy and government waste has a long history. This study provides
empirical evidence to demonstrate its scale and impact in the industrial market, and to evaluate among
alternative explanations. Burgeoning government deficits and soaring public debt levels have increased
concerns about potential adverse impacts on aggregate economic health, limitations to future policy
flexibility, and increasing costs of government finance as the risk mounts. As shown in 2012 Census of
Governments - Surveys of State and Local Government Finances, the combined outstanding debt of U.S.
state and local governments was nearly 3 trillion dollars. And during the past few years, governments
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have tried to reduce the budget deficit and retire the public debt, through various methods, such as cutting
expenses on unnecessary programs and increasing tax revenue, according to the Budget and Economic
Outlook 2014 of Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The analysis of the relationship between
government waste and budgets is shown in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5 shows the test results for the fourth hypothesis. The results indicate that the magnitude of
government waste does not relate to the government budget, where governments with a higher budget do
not pay or sell significantly different for purchases or divestiture.

Table 6 shows the results with a change in the government budget taken into consideration. The results
indicate that if the budget changes, governments with a reduced budget tend to sell their real assets at a
lower price.

Table 7 provides the results of the impact of using brokers in the transactions. From interactive variables
of the results, we can see that using brokers have no significant impact on the price paid or received by
governments in the transactions.

Finally, Table 8 provides the test results for the difference in the impact of political parties. The results
show no significant difference between the Republican and Democratic states.

Robustness test

Since matching plays an important role in this study, in order to ensure that the results of my analyses are
robust, I run analysis with the sample when using one-to-one matching with nearest available neighbor
and allowing replacement. One-to-one matching is performed by matching one observation in the
treatment group with one observation in the control group based on criteria such as the nearest available
neighbor, a defined caliper, and a defined radius until each observation in the treatment group is matched
to one observation in the control group. In the nearest available neighbor matching method, one
observation in the treatment group is matched with one observation in the control group until the
matching provides the smallest difference (pscoreT – pscoreC) in absolute terms, while in caliper
matching, the observations are matched if the difference (pscoreT – pscoreC) is within a certain defined
distance (such as 0.01) so that bad matches are avoided. In addition, observations can be matched with or
without sample replacements. With replacements, observations in the control group can be selected more
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than once in the matching process so that the propensity score distance is minimized. Otherwise,
matching takes place without replacement.

Tables 10 and 11 show the results of the robustness test. Table 10 presents the empirical results without
controlling for sales conditions. Table 11 presents the results of the propensity score matching procedure
with replacement. Panel A of Table 11 shows the estimation for the purchase sample and Panel B for the
sales sample. Governments overpay by an estimated 17.7% and sell at a discount of 8.8% relative to
prices on similar assets transacted by individual buyers or sellers. The estimated coefficients are both
significant.

6. Conclusion

After controlling for selection bias and eliminating alternative explanations, I find that governments buy
high and sell low. The results show that governments underperformed in the market compared to
individuals. The results generally point to government inefficiencies in the use of taxpayer dollars.
Increasing concerns surround growing budget deficits and government use of debt. Any research that
exposes habitual inefficiencies and exposes a drain on government resources, with potential consequences
to the health of the aggregate economy, merits serious attention.

While I am able to provide a direct measure for the quantity of government waste associated with
investment decisions, other factors that may affect the results remain unobservable during my research.
For instance, to what extent government transactions in industrial assets are represented in the CoStar
database is unclear. The sample period of 1991 to 2012 includes the 2008 financial crisis that crippled
many state and local governments. Thus, some of the asset sales are possibly motivated by financial
distress. Some industrial properties may have been policy-targeted for urban redevelopment, and the low
exit price may be rationalized as a write-off toward the goodwill of the local community, even though I
controlled for the redevelopment as a transaction condition in the analysis. Such redevelopment projects
can increase employment, expand the tax base, and have social benefits—if successful. In addition, there
are political timing issues, such as occur during re-election years, where politically strategic investment
decisions fail to coincide with financially strategic investment decisions. Taken together, regardless of the
motivation or rationale, the research in this study exposes governments as underperformers relative to
individual investors. The results indicate room for improvement in government commercial real estate
investment decisions.

76

REFERENCES
Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (1998). Ideological realignment in the US electorate. The Journal
of Politics, 60(03), 634-652.
Allen, M. T., Rutherford, R. C., & Warner, L. J. (1997). A comparison of federal government office rents
with market rents. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 15(2), 181-192.
Ambrose, B. W. (1990). An analysis of the factors affecting light industrial property valuation. Journal of
Real Estate Research, 5(3), 355-370.
Bafumi, J., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2009). A new partisan voter. The Journal of Politics, 71(01), 1-24.
Barry, D. (2004). Cultural Exchange Would Help Unite Red, Blue States. Augusta Chronicle, 12,
December: G6
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., Hardin, W. G., & Wu, Z. (2008). Clientele effects and condo conversions.
Real Estate Economics, 36(3), 611-634.
Billings, S. B., & Thibodeau, T. G. (2013). Financing residential development with special districts. Real
Estate Economics, 41(1), 131-163.
Black, R. T., Wolverton, M. L., Warden, J. T., & Pittman, R. H. (1997). Manufacturing versus
distribution: Implicit pricing of real property characteristics by submarket. The Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 15(3), 271-285.
Burge, G. S. (2011). Do tenants capture the benefits from the low‐income housing tax credit program?
Real Estate Economics, 39(1), 71-96.
Chernobai, A., & Chernobai, E. (2013). Is selection bias inherent in housing transactions? An equilibrium
approach. Real Estate Economics, 41(4), 887-924.
Church, A. M. (1981). The effects of local government expenditure and property taxes on
investment. Real Estate Economics, 9(2), 165-180.
Dale-Johnson, D. (1983). Clientele effects on the demand for housing price appreciation. Real Estate
Economics, 11(3), 382-396.
Fehribach, F. A., Rutherford, R. C., & Eakin, M. E. (1993). An analysis of the determinants of industrial
property valuation. Journal of Real Estate Research, 8(3), 365-376.
Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. (2005). Culture war?. New York, NY: Pearson Longman.
Friedman, M. (2004). Fox News interview.
Harding, J. P., Rosenthal, S. S., & Sirmans, C. F. (2003). Estimating bargaining power in the market for
existing homes. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), 178-188.
Lambson, V. E., McQueen, G. R., & Slade, B. A. (2004). Do out‐of‐state buyers pay more for real estate?
An examination of anchoring‐induced bias and search costs. Real Estate Economics, 32(1), 85-126.
Levendusky, M. S., & Pope, J. C. (2011). Red States vs. Blue States Going Beyond The Mean. Public
Opinion Quarterly, nfr002.
Liu, Y., Gallimore, P., & Wiley, J. A. (2013). Nonlocal office investors: Anchored by their markets and
impaired by their distance. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 50(1), 129-149.
Lockwood, L. J., & Rutherford, R. C. (1996). Determinants of industrial property value. Real Estate
Economics, 24(2), 257-272.
Merriman, D. F., Skidmore, M. L., & Kashian, R. D. (2011). Do tax increment finance districts stimulate
growth in real estate values? Real Estate Economics, 39(2), 221-250.
Mica, J., Petri, T., Duncan, J., LoBiondo, F., Shuster, B., Boozman, J., & Diaz-Balart, M. (2010).
Sitting on our assets: The federal government’s misuse of taxpayer-owned assets. U.S. House of
Representatives Report and analysis.
Noonan, D. S., & Krupka, D. J. (2011). Making—or picking—winners: Evidence of internal and external
price effects in historic preservation policies. Real Estate Economics, 39(2), 379-407.
Ooi, J. T., Sirmans, C. F., & Turnbull, G. K. (2011). Government supply of land in a dual market. Real
Estate Economics, 39(1), 167-184.
Peng, L., & Thibodeau, T. G. (2012). Government interference and the efficiency of the land market in
China. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45(4), 919-938.

77

Smith, B. C. (2009). If you promise to build it, will they come? The interaction between local economic
development policy and the real estate market: Evidence from tax increment finance districts. Real
Estate Economics, 37(2), 209-234.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science,
185(4157), 1124-1131.
United States Census Bureau. (2012). 2012 Census of Governments.
Wiley, J. A. (2012). Buy high, sell low: Corporate investors in the office market. Real Estate Economics,
40(4), 843-860.
Wood, G. A., & Tu, Y. (2004). Are there investor clienteles in rental housing? Real Estate Economics,
32(3), 413-436.
Xu, P., Han, Y., & Yang, J. (2012). U.S. monetary policy surprises and mortgage rates. Real Estate
Economics, 40(3), 461-507.
Zahirovic-Herbert, V., & Gibler, K. M. (2014). Historic district influence on house prices and marketing
duration. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 48(1), 112-131.
Zheng, S., & Kahn, M. E. (2013). Does government investment in local public goods spur gentrification?
Evidence from Beijing. Real Estate Economics, 41(1), 1-28.
Zhou, X., Gibler, K., & Zahirovic-Herbert, V. (2014). Asymmetric buyer information influence on price
in a homogeneous housing market. Urban Studies, 0042098014529464.

78

Table 1. Summary Statistics Government vs. Individual
Panel A. Purchase sample

Variable

Full Sample
(n=11,104)
Mean
Std dev

Government
(n = 335)
Mean

Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Government buyer
Budget Revenue ($)
Budget Change (%)

66.96
116,685
25,275
36.53
0.01
0.31
0.69
0.03
n/a
n/a

82.89
258,879
56,603
40.32
0.02
0.30
0.68
1
1,823,053,085
0.037

61.42
345,614
48,188
22.96
0.09
0.46
0.46
0.20
n/a
n/a

Std dev

Individual:
pre-match (n = 10,769)
Mean
Std dev

Individual:
post-match (n = 335)
Mean
Std dev

86.24
551,495
105,954
24.00
0.14
0.46
0.47
0
7,708,679,651
0.088

66.31
110,817
23,982
36.38
0.01
0.31
0.69
0
n/a
n/a

61.71
196,311
43,707
38.14
0.02
0.33
0.65
0
n/a
n/a

Individual:
post-match (n = 479)
Mean
Std dev
48.31
162,753
37,770
35.87
0.01
0.27
0.71
0
470.87
n/a
n/a

60.09
333,149
43,744
22.91
0.08
0.46
0.46
0
n/a
n/a

70.32
290,065
59,901
24.91
0.13
0.47
0.48
0
n/a
n/a

Panel B. Sales sample

Variable

Full Sample
(n=12,229)
Mean
Std dev

Government
(n = 479)
Mean

Std dev

Individual:
pre-match (n = 11,750)
Mean
Std dev

Price per square foot ($)
Land area (SF)
Building size (SF)
Property age (years)
Class A
Class B
Class C
Government seller
Marketing duration
Budget Revenue ($)
Budget Change (%)

72.03
114,053
26,282
36.95
0.01
0.31
0.68
0.04
427.54
n/a
n/a

41.32
229,327
43,514
36.06
0.01
0.31
0.68
1
480.48
816,242,938
0.030

46.88
959,324
106,486
23.14
0.11
0.46
0.47
0
454.42
939,512,881
0.157

73.56
108,305
25,422
36.99
0.01
0.31
0.68
0
426.59
n/a
n/a

65.90
305,865
51,280
22.68
0.09
0.46
0.46
0.21
415.94
n/a
n/a

66.34
227,397
46,699
22.66
0.08
0.46
0.46
0
415.19
n/a
n/a

62.55
341,157
71,148
22.13
0.11
0.45
0.45
0
441.52
n/a
n/a

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the purchase sample, in Panel A, the sales sample, in Panel B. The
first column lists the variable name. The subsequent columns report the sample mean (Mean) and standard deviation
(Std dev) for the full sample, the subsample of transactions by Government investors, the subsample of transactions
by Individual investors before (pre-match) and after the propensity-score matching (post-match) sequentially.
Variable definitions: Price per square foot is the transaction price for the industrial property, in U.S. dollars, divided
by Building size. Land area is the gross square footage of the lot. Building size is the rentable building area,
measured in square foot (SF). Property age is measured in years relative to the transaction date. Class A, Class B,
and Class C are indicator variables taking on a value of one for the respective property class and zero otherwise.
Government buyer and Government seller are indicator variables, taking on a value of one if the property is bought or
sold by Government buyer (seller). Budget Revenue is the adopted budget revenue of the local government in the fiscal
year when the transaction taken, measured in dollars. Budget Change is calculated as current year (budget revenue – last
year revenue) / last year revenue40.

40

In this study, budget revenue is used as a cross sectional measure. It measures the budget revenue on different governments
and then compare, no repeat sale. Budget change in this study measures the year to year change on the same government.
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Table 2. Probit, Governments vs. Individuals
Panel A1. Probit for government buyer (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-8.023
0.00
Constant
***
0.181
31.01
ln(land area)
-0.012
0.12
ln(building size)
***
0.115
7.53
ln(property age)
-0.131
0.30
Class A
-0.071
1.20
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [17 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [55 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [136 variables]
pseudo-R2:
16.71%
Observations:
11,104

Panel B1. Probit for government seller (pre-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
***
-3.179
17.12
Constant
**
0.068
4.99
ln(land area)
0.041
1.53
ln(building size)
0.050
2.11
ln(property age)
-0.302
2.04
Class A
-0.094
2.70
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Included [9 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [19 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [62 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [127 variables]
pseudo-R2:
22.36%
Observations:
12,229

Panel A2. Probit for government buyer (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
1.262
1.20
Constant
0.017
0.07
ln(land area)
-0.055
0.62
ln(building size)
-0.093
1.09
ln(property age)
-0.129
0.06
Class A
-0.176
1.20
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [26 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
pseudo-R2:
8.10%
Observations:
670

Panel B2. Probit for government seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)
-5.017
0.00
Constant
0.041
0.50
ln(land area)
-0.064
1.01
ln(building size)
-0.021
0.08
ln(property age)
0.778
2.10
Class A
0.149
1.63
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [25 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
pseudo-R2:
23.47%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the results from the probit estimation for buyer (seller) identity. Panel A1 (B1) represents
the initial probit for the buyer (seller) sample, pre-matching. Panel A2 (B2) provides results for the probit estimation
using the post-match samples to confirm success in propensity score matching. The dependent variable is
government buyer (seller), which has a value of one if the property is bought (sold) by government. The variables
land area, building size, and property age, are each logged. The panels present the variables' names in the first
column, the estimated coefficient in the second, and the Wald Χ2 test statistic in the third. All variables are defined
in the notes to Table 1. In addition, before matching, the estimation includes 9 (9) indicator variables to control for
secondary property types, 17 (19) indicators to control for year of transaction, 55 (62) indicators to control for
unique sale conditions, and 136 (127) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed.
After matching, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicator variables to control for secondary property types, 7 (7)
indicators to control for year of transaction, 26 (25) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 79 (76)
indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding Wald statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3. Estimated Premiums, Governments vs. Individuals
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.651 ***
7.61
Constant
0.095 ***
2.78
ln(land area)
-0.324 ***
-8.81
ln(building size)
-0.131 ***
-2.80
ln(property age)
0.350
1.26
Class A
0.148 **
2.14
Class B
0.098 *
1.78
Government buyer
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [26 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
Adjusted R2:
54.57%
Observations:
670

Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.830 ***
22.73
Constant
0.150 ***
6.19
ln(land area)
-0.363 ***
-13.49
ln(building size)
-0.283 ***
-9.58
ln(property age)
0.110
0.49
Class A
0.055
1.14
Class B
-0.173 ***
-3.99
Government seller
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [25 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
Adjusted R2:
54.01%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the results from the estimation of price per square foot for the purchase and
sales samples. Panel A presents results for the propensity score matched buyer sample, while Panel B
provides results for the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot,
land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in
the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. The t
statistics and reported significance levels are based on standard errors clustered by market and
calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in
the first column, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicators to control for secondary property types, 7 (7)
indicators to control for year of transaction, 26 (25) indicators to control for unique sale conditions,
and 79 (76) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Marketing Duration, Sales Sample, Governments vs. Individuals
Variable
Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Government seller
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Adjusted R2:
Observations:

Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.557 ***
4.58
-0.057
-0.86
0.166 **
2.24
-0.048
-0.56
-0.058
-0.10
0.284 **
2.02
-0.068
-0.49
Included [7 variables]
Included [6 variables]
Included [17 variables]
Included [68 variables]
5.36%
426

Notes: This table presents the estimation results
for marketing duration, considering the sales
sample of transactions. Due to missing
observations for the marketing duration variable,
the
propensity-score-matched
sample
is
performed again (results unreported) matching
transactions between corporate sellers with
comparable assets sold by non-institutional
investors, where marketing duration information
is available. The variables Marketing duration,
Land area, Building size and Property age are
each logged. The table presents the variable
name in the first column, the estimated
coefficient in the second, and the t-statistic (in
parentheses) in the third. The t-statistic and
reported significance level are based on standard
errors clustered by market and calendar year. All
variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first
column, the estimation also includes indicators
to control for secondary property types,
transaction years, sale conditions, and markets,
with one suppressed. *** and * indicate statistical
significance of the estimated coefficient, based
on the corresponding t-statistic at the 1% and
10% levels respectively.
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Table 5. Estimated Premiums, Government Budget (Government Only)
Panel A. Buyers sample
Variable
Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Ln(Budget Revenue)
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Adjusted R2:
Observations:

Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.510 **
3.73
0.161 **
2.47
-0.366 ***
-5.95
-0.120 *
-1.72
-0.482
-1.00
-0.046
-0.35
0.047
0.60
Included [7 variables]
Included [6 variables]
Included [12 variables]
Included [29 variables]
73.01%
195

Panel B. Sellers sample
Variable
Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Ln(Budget Revenue)
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Adjusted R2:
Observations:

Coefficient
(t-stat)
9.380 ***
4.35
0.160 *
1.73
-0.538 ***
-4.86
-0.432 *
-1.90
-2.093 *
-1.66
-0.097
-0.42
-0.096
-1.06
Included [6 variables]
Included [6 variables]
Included [13 variables]
Included [28 variables]
68.24%
120

Notes: This table presents the results from the estimation of price per square foot for the purchase and
sales samples. Panel A presents results for the buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the
seller sample. The variables Price per square foot, Land area, Building size, Property age and Budget
Revenue are each logged. The Panels present the variable name in the first column, the estimated
coefficient in the second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. All variables are defined in
the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 7
(6) indicators to control for secondary property types, 6 (6) indicators to control for year of
transaction, 12 (13) indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 29 (28) indicators to control
for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of
the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 6. Estimated Premiums, Government Budget Fluctuation (Government Only)
Panel A. Buyers sample
Variable
Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Budget Change
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Adjusted R2:
Observations:

Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.257 *
1.95
0.234 *
1.67
-0.455 ***
-2.97
-0.211
-0.92
0.312
1.15
0.480
1.41
0.014
1.06
Included [7 variables]
Included [6 variables]
Included [12 variables]
Included [26 variables]
49.41%
146

Panel B. Sellers sample
Variable
Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Budget Change
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Adjusted R2:
Observations:

Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.657 ***
3.86
0.173 *
1.90
-0.430 ***
-4.18
-0.671 ***
-2.73
0.122
0.54
-0.234
-0.92
0.015 **
2.07
Included [4 variables]
Included [6 variables]
Included [13 variables]
Included [23 variables]
76.54%
107

Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales
samples. Panel A presents results for the buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for the seller
sample. The variables Price per square foot, Land area, Building size, Property age and Change are
each logged. The Panels present the variable name in the first column, the estimated coefficient in
the second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the third. All variables are defined in the notes to
Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 7 (4) indicators
to control for secondary property types, 6 (6) indicators to control for year of transaction, 12 (13)
indicators to control for unique sale conditions, and 26 (23) indicators to control for geographic
property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Estimated Premiums with Brokerage Intermediation, Governments vs. Individuals
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.704 ***
7.69
Constant
0.097 ***
2.83
ln(Land area)
-0.332 ***
-8.93
ln(Building size)
-0.123 ***
-2.59
ln(Property age)
0.368
1.32
Class A
0.148 **
2.13
Class B
0.177
1.25
Government buyer* Buyer broker
0.053 *
1.81
Government buyer
Buyer broker
0.025
0.25
-0.200 *
-1.79
Same broker
List broker
-0.017
-0.25
Secondary type indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [26 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
Adjusted R2:
54.66%
Observations:
670

Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
6.734 ***
22.06
Constant
0.153 ***
6.29
ln(Land area)
-0.364 ***
-13.53
ln(Building size)
-0.280 ***
-9.44
ln(Property age)
0.121
0.54
Class A
0.050
1.04
Class B
-0.038
-0.34
Government buyer* List broker
-0.137 **
-2.46
Government seller
List broker
-0.003
-0.04
0.087
1.09
Same broker
Buyer broker
0.135 **
2.00
Secondary type indicators:
Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [25 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
Adjusted R2:
54.07%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales samples.
Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B provides results for
the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot, land area, building size,
and property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in the first column, the estimated
coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. The t statistics and reported significance levels are
based on standard errors clustered by market and calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to
Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicators to
control for secondary property types, 7 (7) indicators to control for year of transaction, 26 (25) indicators to
control for unique sale conditions, and 79 (76) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with
one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the
corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8. Estimated Premiums, Governments vs. Individuals (Political Party Impacts)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
4.674 ***
7.59
Constant
0.095 ***
2.76
ln(land area)
-0.323 ***
-8.77
ln(building size)
-0.128 ***
-2.72
ln(property age)
0.358
1.29
Class A
0.147 **
2.13
Class B
0.089 *
1.79
Government buyer
0.246
0.75
Republican states
0.026
0.20
Republican Government
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [26 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
Adjusted R2:
63.25%
Observations:
670

Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
5.391 ***
12.31
Constant
0.148 ***
6.10
ln(land area)
-0.346 ***
-12.98
ln(building size)
-0.266 ***
-8.96
ln(property age)
-0.047
-0.21
Class A
0.054
1.12
Class B
-0.176 ***
-3.76
Government seller
-0.406
-1.45
Republican states
0.085
0.69
Republican Government
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [25 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
Adjusted R2:
57.58%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales
samples. Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B
provides results for the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot,
land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels present the variables’ names in
the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. The t
statistics and reported significance levels are based on standard errors clustered by market and
calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in
the first column, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicators to control for secondary property types, 7 (7)
indicators to control for year of transaction, 26 (25) indicators to control for unique sale conditions,
and 79 (76) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t statistic at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 1-1: Table 9. Estimated Premiums, Governments vs. Individuals (Without Controlling
for Sale Conditions)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
7.632 ***
16.61
Constant
0.128 ***
3.38
ln(land area)
***
-0.426
-10.16
ln(building size)
-0.135 ***
-2.57
ln(property age)
0.345
0.96
Class A
0.153 **
2.01
Class B
0.203 ***
3.38
Government buyer
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
Adjusted R2:
52.41%
Observations:
670

Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
5.007 ***
10.60
Constant
0.175 ***
5.98
ln(land area)
***
-0.393
-12.39
ln(building size)
-0.193 ***
-5.61
ln(property age)
-0.120
-0.50
Class A
0.107 **
1.98
Class B
-0.195 ***
-4.06
Government seller
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
Adjusted R2:
47.04%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales
samples. Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B
provides results for the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables price per square foot,
land area, building size, and property age are each logged. The panels present the variables' names in
the first column, the estimated coefficients in the second, and the t statistics in the third. The t
statistics and reported significance levels are based on standard errors clustered by market and
calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed in
the first column, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicators to control for secondary property types, 7 (7)
indicators to control for year of transaction, and 79 (76) indicators to control for geographic property
markets, with one suppressed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient
based on the corresponding t statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 1-2: Table 10-1. Probit, Government vs. Individual (Robustness Check, with
Replacement)
Panel A. Probit for Government buyer (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient
(Wald Χ2)

Panel B. Probit for Government seller (post-match)
Variable
Coefficient (Wald Χ2)

Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
Psuedo-R2:
Observations:

Constant
ln(Land area)
ln(Building size)
ln(Property age)
Class A
Class B
Secondary type indicators:
Year indicators:
Sale conditions:
Market indicators:
psuedo-R2:
Observations:

6.733
0.001
-0.078
1.599
0.005
0.006
-0.118
2.413
-0.112
0.070
0.058
0.216
Included [8 variables]
Included [7 variables]
Included [26 variables]
Included [79 variables]
13.56%
670

11.380
-0.027
-0.043
0.012
-0.508
-0.046
Included [8 variables]
Included [7 variables]
Included [25 variables]
Included [76 variables]
13.14%
958

0.002
0.231
0.488
0.028
1.084
0.185

Notes: This table presents the probit estimation results for buyer (seller) identity, in Panel A (Panel B). The
dependent variable is Government buyer (seller), which takes on a value of one if the property is bought or sold by
the government. The variables Land area, Building size, and Property age are each logged. The panels present the
variable name in the first column, the estimated coefficient in the second, the Wald Χ2 test statistic (in parentheses)
in the third, and the average marginal effect in the fourth. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In
addition to the variables listed in the first column, the estimation also includes 8 (8) indicators to control for
secondary property types, 7 (7) indicators to control for transaction years, 26 (25) indicators to control for sale
conditions, and 79 (76) indicators to control for markets, with one suppressed. *** indicate statistical significance
of the estimated coefficient, based on the Wald Χ2 test statistic at the 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 1-3: Table 10-2. Estimated Premiums, Government vs. Individual (Robustness Check,
with Replacement)
Panel A. Buyers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Constant
7.096 ***
17.20
ln(Land area)
0.047
1.13
ln(Building size)
-0.324 ***
-7.73
ln(Property age)
-0.214 ***
-7.91
Class A
0.310 **
2.04
Class B
0.052 *
1.77
Government buyer
0.177 **
2.02
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [26 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [79 variables]
Adjusted R2:
59.49%
Observations:
670

Panel B. Sellers, propensity-score-matched sample
Variable
Coefficient
(t-stat)
Constant
5.690 ***
52.94
ln(Land area)
0.131 ***
4.50
ln(Building size)
-0.371 ***
-13.29
ln(Property age)
-0.285 ***
-6.00
Class A
0.046
0.22
Class B
0.113 ***
2.49
Government seller
-0.088 **
-2.14
Secondary type indicators: Included [8 variables]
Year indicators:
Included [7 variables]
Sale conditions:
Included [25 variables]
Market indicators:
Included [76 variables]
Adjusted R2:
53.41%
Observations:
958

Notes: This table presents the estimation results of price per square foot for the purchase and sales
samples. Panel A presents results for the propensity-score-matched buyer sample, while Panel B
provides results for the propensity-score-matched seller sample. The variables Price per square foot,
Land area, Building size, and Property age are each logged. The Panels present the variable name in
the first column, the estimated coefficient in the second, and the t-statistic (in parentheses) in the
third. The t-statistic and reported significance level are based on standard errors clustered by market
and calendar year. All variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. In addition to the variables listed
in the first column, the estimation includes 8 (8) indicators to control for secondary property types, 7
(7) indicators to control for year of transaction, 26 (25) indicators to control for unique sale
conditions, and 79 (76) indicators to control for geographic property markets, with one suppressed.
*** **
, , and * indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient based on the corresponding t
statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix 2
Sales Process for City-Owned Property, City of New Orleans
(Source: http://www.nola.gov/city-owned-property/)

1. The City may sell (through public auction) immovable property (real estate) that is no longer needed for public
purpose. These particular auctions are different than the Sheriff’s auctions or NORA’s auctions. The process for
bringing property any city owned property to auction is lengthy. The steps are as follows:
2. The Department of Property Management, through the Division of Real Estate and Records, locates property that
the City is not using. A constituent may bring a request regarding a particular property to the Division and request
that it will be sold at public auction.
3. If the property is deemed saleable, the requested sale is presented to the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) for
review, comments, and recommendations. If any city department may determine that the property is still needed for
public use then the sale will not move forward.
4. If approved by PAC, the requested sale is then submitted to the City Planning Commission (CPC) for approval or
denial. CPC may deny, approve, or conditionally approve the auction of a property. CPC may place provisos on the
sale of the property, which will require that certain terms and/or obligations are met prior to or as part of the sale.
5. If the sale is approved or conditionally approved with provisos, the property is appraised to determine fair market
value.
6. After a value is determined, the auction of the property must be approved by the City Council. An ordinance
containing the property description, appraised value, and any provisos set by the CPC is introduced to the City
Council.
7. If the Ordinance is passed and approved by the Mayor, an auction date and time is set and an advertisement runs
in the Times Picayune Newspaper three times over a span of thirty days. The property may have an “open house”
during this period.
8. At least thirty days after the ordinance has been signed by the Mayor, the property auction is held. The starting
bid is the fair market value of the property. Auctions are held in the City Council Chambers at City Hall.
9. A winning bidder must deposit 10% of the winning bid amount with the Real Estate and Records Division (Room
5W06) within one (1) hour of the completion of the auction. The deposit must be in cash, certified check, or money
order and is NON-REFUNDABLE. If a deposit is not timely made, the property is offered to the second highest
bidder.
10. The act of sale is sent to the City Law Department for review and signature. The purchaser typically has 120
days to coordinate with the Law Department to complete the sale. If there is a proviso attached to the property sale
by the CPC, it will become part of the act of sale. The remainder of the payment, as well as costs associated with
promulgation of the ordinance and advertising are all due at the signing of the act of sale.
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Appendix 3
The Statistics of U.S. Presidential Election 1992–201241
State / Year
Democratic/Republican
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2012
D

2008

R
9
3
11
6

55
9
7
3
3
29

D

2004

R
9
3
10
6

D

55
9
7
3
3
27
16

4

55
9

11
6

6
8
9

6
4
14
5
29
15
3
18

1*
5
4
15
5
31
15

4
10
12
17
9*
6
11
3
4*

5
31
15
3
20
7

3
20

7
7
20
4

7
7
21
4

9
3
11
38
6
3
13
12

7
21
4
8
3
11
34
5

5

7
23
4

3

3

11
5

5
10

3

3

Source: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
41

The number showing here in the chart is the number of Electoral College votes
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6

5
3

6
8
9
4
10
12
18
10

7
11
3
5
4
4
15
5
33

7
11
3
5
4
4
15
5
33

14
3
21

14
3
21

8

8
7
23
4

8
3
11

8
3
11

32
5
3

11

12
7

8
9
4
10
12
18
10

13
11

4

12

7
23
4
8
3
11
32
5

13

10
3

14
3
21
8

8
3
11
34
5

3
13
11

10

15
5
33

13
4
22

7

7
11
3
5
4
4

R
9
3
8

6
54
8
8
3
3

4

12
6
8
9

D

25
13

22

4
10
12
18
10

4
15

8
8
3
3
25
4

7

6
11
3
5
5

1992
R
9
3

8
6
54

4
22

11
7
6
8
9

4
10
12
17
10
6
10
3
5

25
13
4

21

D

8

4

21
11
7

6
8
8
4
10
11
16
10

4
4

1996
R
9
3
8
6

8
3
2*
27
15

4

20

D

54

7
3
3
15

4

2000

R
9
3
10
6

32
5
3

13
11
5
11

13
11
5
11

3

3

